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Part-time workers in the United States often encounter significant
obstacles in their- search for challenging and rewarding part-time jobs.
Two of the major obstacles are pay disparities between full-time and
part-time workers and part-time workers' lack of access to desirable,
highly compensated part-time jobs. Because the part-time work force is
predominantly female, Professor Chamallas adopts a feminist perspec-
tive in examining the problems of part-time workers, arguing that dis-
crimination against part-timers is a species of discrimination against
women. The Article begins with an examination of the character of the
part-time work force and the pay disparities that exist between full-time
and part-time workers. Using sociological data, the Article next ex-
plores the connection between sex discrimination and the plight of the
part-time worker. After a review offederal laws prohibiting sex discrim-
ination in employment, Professor Chamallas proposes new interpretive
approaches to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that would help to provide part-time workers with pay equity and
equal access to desirable part-time employment.
Because millions of Americans work only part-time,' the availability of
good part-time jobs is often essential to them in balancing the demands of eco-
nomic self-support with their other responsibilities. Part-time work fits the
needs and desires of several distinct groups of employees. For example, students
may need to work part-time to finance their educations. Older workers may
wish to make a gradual transition into retirement. Physically handicapped
workers may be incapable of working a forty hour week. 2
Above all, part-time work holds a special attraction for parents. When they
cannot meet the competing demands of a full-time job and a newborn baby, even
the most career-minded parents may wish to find part-time employment. The
parents of a newborn may wistfully recall that, when they were growing up, one
full-time job seemed to provide sufficient income to raise a family. Conse-
quently, they may expect that if each parent works twenty hours a week, that
work will generate enough money to support the family. For the single parent
who bears the birden of childrearing alone, there is also the dream of the ideal
1. As of February 1985 there were 13,647,000 voluntary part-time workers in the United
States. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 45
(Mar. 1985).
2. See, e.g., Federal Employees Part-Time Career Employment Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3401-
3408 (1982) (enacted in part to help persons who are unable to work standard working hours, such
as students, older workers, and physically handicapped workers, secure permanent part-time work).
The Act requires all federal agencies to establish and maintain a program for part-time career em-
ployment. One purpose of the Act is to provide increased employment opportunities fot persons
unable to work standard working hours. S. REP. No. 1116, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2596, 2601.
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part-time job-a job that pays enough to live on, yet allows the parent ample
time with his or her children.
These idyllic scenarios are rare in the American workplace. Part-time work
has yet to function as a viable solution to the career/childrearing conflict. In-
stead, part-time employment is decidedly second class. Part-time work is un-
derpaid, concentrated in the services sector, and regarded as marginal and
inferior employment by employers and society alike.
The overwhelming majority of part-time workers are women, most often
women with children.3 Because part-time work is primarily "women's work," it
tends to occupy the same low position in the hierarchy of work as does full-time
predominantly female work.
The central perspective of this Article is that the inferior status of part-time
employment stems in part from sex discrimination. Drawing on the feminist
theory emerging in the "pay equity" or "comparable worth" movement,4 this
Article begins with the premise that the female character of the part-time work
force has contributed to the undesirable plight of part-time workers, both male
and female.
To date, the principal laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment,
notably the Equal Pay Act5 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 have
provided scant protection for part-time workers. Part-time employees have not
yet achieved either pay equity or equal access to employment. Part-time work-
ers are sometimes paid less than full-time workers for identical work7 and are
frequently paid less than full-time workers for different work of comparable
value.8 Further, part-time workers are likely to be excluded altogether from
better paying, higher status positions. 9 Unless employees are willing to work
3. See infra text accompanying notes 23-29.
4. The United States Supreme Court has characterized a comparable worth claim as one in
which "plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic
worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or community."
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981). Although the precise definition of the
term is unclear, the crux of a comparable worth claim is that a job classification comprised predomi-
nantly of females is paid at a rate lower than its evaluated worth, measured by such factors as
knowledge, skill, and mental or physical demands. As one lower court has observed, the
quintessential element common to all [definitions of comparable worth] is that discrimina-
tion exists when workers of one sex in one job category are paid less than workers of the
other sex in another job category and both categories are performing work that is not the
same in content, but is of comparable worth to the employer in terms of value and
necessity.
Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 722 (W.D. Mich. 1982). Comparable worth theory thus
may be used to challenge wage rates in predominantly female jobs even when there is no identical or
similar job performed by males at a higher wage. The term "pay equity" is sometimes used inter-
changeably with "comparable worth." It may also be used as a broader term to describe any reform
measure aimed at upgrading the pay of women workers. For example, if a plaintiff claims that her
employer intentionally depressed the wage rate for female jobs, her claim is for pay equity, but it is
not, strictly speaking, a comparable worth claim. For an explanation of another distinction some-
times made between comparable worth and comparable work claims, see infra notes 282-83.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 49-55.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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forty hours a week, they often are not considered for such desirable jobs, regard-
less of their qualifications or experience.
This Article suggests new ways of interpreting the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII to provide fuller protection for both female and male part-time workers.
Although these interpretations alone are unlikely to transform the status or rep-
utation of part-time work, they may reveal some of the ways unfavorable treat-
ment of part-time workers is linked to sex discrimination.
Part 1I° of the Article sketches a picture of the part-time work force in the
United States. It explains the varying definitions of part-time work and de-
scribes the sectors in which part-time workers are employed. Statistics on the
sexual composition of the part-time work force are reviewed, and the pay dispar-
ity between part-time and full-time workers is documented. Finally, Part I ex-
plores possible reasons for this pay disparity and catalogues the negative
perceptions about part-time work that perpetuate the disparity.
Part II11 considers part-time work from a feminist perspective and attempts
to explain the adverse treatment of part-time workers as a special brand of sex
discrimination. It presents an account of the part-time worker as inseparable in
the public consciousness from the "working mother." Public opinion data is
analyzed to discover how attitudes towards working mothers might simultane-
ously justify the inhospitable treatment of part-time workers and perpetuate the
economic dependence of married working women. The conclusion of Part II
addresses the reluctance of some reformers to encourage part-time work.
Part 11112 analyzes the existing legal framework outlawing sex discrimina-
tion in employment, with a particular focus on sex discrimination affecting part-
time workers. It examines relevant developments under the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII and presents two proposals for reinterpreting these statutes to provide
a partial solution to the problems of pay inequity and unequal access that afflict
part-time employees.
The first proposal 13 provides a remedy for pay inequity for part-time work-
ers under the Equal Pay Act. The major thrust of the proposal is that the basic
principles of the Equal Pay Act should apply in full force to part-time employees
and that there should be no blanket exemption for any class of part-time work-
ers. Under this proposal, part-time workers asserting a claim under the Equal
Pay Act would be required to establish that although they perform work sub-
stantially equal to that of full-time workers, they receive less pay, including
fringe benefits. Once this prima facie showing had been made, the employer
could defend only by proving that its part-time workers were less effective or
qualified than their full-time counterparts.
The second proposal' 4 provides a special framework for litigating Title VII
"comparable worth" cases on behalf of part-time workers. The proposal is a
10. See infra text accompanying notes 15-84.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 85-161.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 162-344.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 233-76.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 314-44.
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variant of the disparate treatment model of proving sex discrimination and is
designed to respond directly to the twin problems of inadequate pay and unequal
access. The focus of litigation under this proposal would be to discover whether
the employer purposefully used part-time status as a device to keep the wages of
women employees disproportionately low. The plaintiff's prima facie burden
would require a showing that the predominantly female part-time work force is
paid less than comparably situated full-time workers. In addition to rebutting
the plaintiff's claim of job comparability, the employer would be allowed the
special defense of proving that it provided adequate opportunities for high pay-
ing part-time jobs. This special defense could defeat the claim that part-time
status functions to keep female wages low. The proposed allocation of the bur-
den of proof would provide both an incentive for the creation of desirable part-
time jobs and a degree of protection against the devaluation of part-time work
stemming from sex bias.
I. THE PART-TIME WORK FORCE
A. Definition of Part-Time Work
In a society in which the patterns of work are rapidly changing, it is not
surprising that there is no single, all-purpose definition of part-time work. Since
1948, however, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has used a standard of thirty-five
hours per week to differentiate between full-time and part-time work.1 5 Persons
working thirty-five hours or more are considered full-time workers; those work-
ing thirty-four or fewer hours make up the part-time work force. 16
Within the part-time work force, there are many workers who voluntarily
limit their work weeks to fewer than thirty-five hours. 17 These voluntary part-
time workers constitute an estimated eighty percent of the part-time work
15. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
Series P-50, No. 3, at 1 (Jan. 21, 1948). It was not until 1930 that the Bureau of the Census began to
collect any data on persons not designated as the head of a family. In that year, enumerators were
instructed to list any wage-earning homemaker in order to discover "how many women are both
homemakers and wage earners." WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYED WO-
MAN HOMEMAKER IN THE UNITED STATES-HER RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAMILY SUPPORT, Bulle-
tin No. 148, at 1 (1936).
16. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN
No. 298, TIME OF CHANGE: 1983 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 36 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as 1983 HANDBOOK]; Hedges & Gallogly, Full and Part Time: A Review of Definitions, 100
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 21 (Mar. 1977). Occasionally, other definitions of part-time work are used.
See, eg., Federal Employees Part-Time Career Employment Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982) (16
to 32 hours per week); Hedges & Gallogly, supra, at 21 (definition used by International Labor Office
is "regular, voluntary employment [carried out] during working hours that are distinctly shorter
than normal"). Most of the empirical studies cited in this Article, however, use the thirty-five hour
standard in describing the American work force.
17. These voluntary part-time workers should be distinguished from involuntary part-time
workers. Persons who work part-time involuntarily are those who desire full-time work but, because
of economic conditions, must work fewer than 35 hours a week. The involuntary part-time work
force includes persons who settle for part-time work because they cannot find full-time jobs and
persons whose hours per week have been reduced from full-time to part-time status. See BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T or LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2169, LINKING EMPLOYMENT
PROBLEMS TO ECONOMIC STATUS 1, 3-4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS].
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force. 18 The remainder of the part-time work force is underemployed and works
part-time involuntarily. This Article is primarily concerned with voluntary, reg-
ular part-time workers who are not actively seeking full-time jobs. 19
The group of voluntary part-time workers has grown rapidly since 1954,
the first year for which refined data on part-time employment were collected. In
1954, eight percent of all employees were voluntary part-time workers.20 The
corresponding figure for 1985 was twelve percent. 2 1 The group of voluntary
part-time workers ranges from persons who work only a few hours a week up to
those who work thirty-four hours per week. In 1977, the median number of
hours for adult part-time workers was 19.5 hours per week. 22
B. Female Character of the Part-Time Work Force
The one characteristic that stands out in any description of the part-time
work force is its predominantly female composition. In 1981 women constituted
sixty-nine percent of the part-time work force, compared to only thirty-nine per-
cent of the full-time work force.23 Looking solely at the voluntary part-time
work force, the proportion of female employees is even greater. In 1981 the
proportion of women on voluntary part-time schedules was three times as great
as the proportion of men. 24
Of course, voluntary part-time work is attractive for other classes of em-
ployees besides adult women. Many students seek part-time jobs to allow them
18. See Nollen, Eddy, Martin & Monroe, Permanent Part Time Employment: An Interpretive
Review, in Hearing on S. 517, S. 518, H.R. 7-814, H.R. 10126 Before the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 387, 390 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nollen] ("About 80% of all people
working part-time in nonagricultural industries in 1974 were doing so voluntarily."); EMPLOYMENT
PROBLEMS, supra note 17, at 3 (only 25% of wives who worked part-time in 1981 did so involunta-
rily); 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 36-37 (80% of all women who worked part-time in 1981
did so voluntarily).
19. Regular part-time employment should be distinguished from intermittent and temporary
employment. As used in this Article, part-time employment means employment carried out on a
regular basis during working hours. In contrast, intermittent employment is employment on an
occasional basis; such work is unplanned and unpredictable in regard to both availability and dura-
tion. Similarly, temporary employment is employment of a limited, fixed duration, either full-time
or part-time. Nollen, supra note 18, at 388. Although this Article addresses only regular, voluntary
part-time work, much of the discussion may be applicable to temporary and intermittent employ-
ment as well.
20. Deutermann & Brown, Voluntary Part-Tine Workers: A Growing Part ofthe Labor Force,
101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (June 1978).
21. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 48
(Oct. 1985).
22. Leon & Bednarzik, A Profile of Women on Part-tine Schedules, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
3, 9 (Oct. 1978).
23. Mellor & Stamas, Usual Weekly Earnings: Another Look at Intergroup Differences and
Basic Trends, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15, 21 (Apr. 1982).
24. See 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 37 (22% of female workers and 7% of male work-
ers were voluntary part-time workers in 1981); see also EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 186 (1983) (in 1981
women represented 70.3% of all voluntary part-time employees); Blumrosen & Culp, Reducing the
Workweek to Expand Employment: A Surey of Industrial Response, 9 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J.
393, 403 (1984) (percentage of male workers with part-time schedules grew only from 10% to 12.1%
between 1950 and 1978, but percentage of women workers who worked part-time increased from
26.2% to 32.2%).
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to complete their educations. 25 Older workers and handicapped employees may
prefer part-time schedules to accommodate impaired health or to allow a grad-
ual transition into retirement. 26 However, the voluntary part-time work force is
still largely the enclave of women, particularly women who care for children.27
For every twenty voluntary part-time workers in 1977, eleven were adult wo-
men, four were adult men, and five were teenagers.28 In 1983 the Department of
Labor noted that the "general proffle" of the part-time worker was that of a
woman with school-age children who was married to a full-time worker.29
C. Pay Disparity Between Full-Time and Part-Time Workers
The feminization of the part-time work force is associated with depressed
wages, a phenomenon that has recently received much attention with respect to
predominantly female full-time jobs.30 Pro rata, part-time workers earn less
than their full-time counterparts. In 1981, although part-time employees
worked forty-six percent of the hours worked by full-time employees, they
earned only twenty-eight percent of the wages earned by full-time employees. 31
The average part-time worker in 1979 was paid only $3.12 per hour, compared
to $4.96 per hour for full-time workers.32 Even within the female work force,
25. See S. REP. No. 1116, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2596, 2601.
26. See id.
27. See Greenwald, Part Time Work, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 182, 183 (A.
Cahn ed. 1979) (approximately one-third of working mothers try to balance work and home respon-
sibilities by working part-time).
28. Leon & Bednarzik, supra note 22, at 3; see also Smith, The Effects of Hours Rigidity on the
Labor Market Status of Women, 11 URB. & Soc. CHANGE REV. 43, 44 (1978) (in 1976 only three in
ten male part-time workers were adults under age 55, but six in ten female part-time workers were in
this age group).
29. 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 37-38; see Barrett, Women in the Job Market: Unem-
ployment and Work Schedules, in THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION 63, 81 (R. Smith ed. 1979) (among
employed married women, those with children under 18 are most likely to work part-time); Leon &
Bednarzik, supra note 22, at 6 (hypothetical part-time worker is married to a full-time worker and
has children who are at least school age); see also EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, R & D MONOGRAPH No. 46, WOMEN AND WORK 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wo-
MEN AND WORK] (in 1973, 55% of all part-time female workers had preschool children).
30. For a sampling of the growing literature on the depressed wages of employees in predomi-
nantly female jobs, see COMM. ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY OF
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES:
EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 19-24, 41-42 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES]; M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE
WORTH (1983); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 15-18
(1984) (statement of Andrea Belier, Assist. Prof., Univ. of Ill.); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination,
Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 402-57
(1979) (criticized in Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth"
Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231 (1980)).
31. Mellor & Stamas, supra note 23, at 20-21.
32. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WAGE AND SALARY DATA FROM
THE INCOME SURVEY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 1979, at 6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WAGE AND
SALARY DATA]; see also 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 92 (in 1981, the average male full-time
worker earned $6.25 per hour compared with the average male part-time employee, who earned
$3.20 per hour; the average female full-time worker earned $3.98 per hour compared with the aver-
age female part-time employee, who earned $3.21 per hour). The near equivalence of pay rates for
part-time men and women employees may result from male part-time workers being either
"younger-than-average or older-than-average workers." Barrett, supra note 29, at 85.
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there is a wage gap between part-time and full-time employees. For women with
full-time schedules, the median wage in 1983 was $3.98 per hour, compared with
$3.21 per hour for part-time women workers. 33
The exclusion of part-time workers from important fringe benefits is even
more pronounced than the disparity in rates of pay. For example, a 1972 wage
survey disclosed that only one-half of the part-time work force received any of
the holiday or vacation benefits given to full-time employees. 34 Another study
in 1982 found that only 18.5 percent of part-time employees received health
insurance provided by employers or unions, compared to 74.3 percent of full-
time employees. 35 The same study revealed that only 11.9 percent of part-time
employees were covered by employer or union pension plans, as compared to
53.1 percent of full-time employees. 36
The pay disparity between full-time and part-time workers does not stem
from any single source. Like the persistent wage gap between male and female
full-time employees, the part-time/full-time disparity appears to be a product of
several factors, some of which are attributable to sex-based discrimination. The
literature on part-time work most frequently cites the following six somewhat
overlapping explanations for the pay disparity between full-time and part-time
employees.
1. Personal Characteristics of Workers
Part of the pay disparity between full-time and part-time workers may re-
sult from the relatively high concentration of teenagers who hold part-time jobs.
In 1977 more than half of employed teenagers, both male and female, were vol-
untarily working part-time.37 Aside from their age, however, part-time workers
do not differ appreciably from full-time workers in personal characteristics 38
that might justifiably influence wages. Part-time workers are as diverse as full-
33. 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 92; see also Leon & Bednarzik, supra note 22, at 10 (in
May 1977 female part-time wage and salary workers earned approximately four-fifths as much as
full-time female workers); Smith, supra note 28, at 44 (women with part-time schedules earn 25%
less than women with full-time schedules).
34. WOMEN AND WORK, supra note 29, at 27.
35. Hefferan, Employee Benefits, 1 FAM. ECON. REV. 6, 10 (1985); see also Wambheim v. J.C.
Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1493 (9th Cir. 1983) (medical and dental insurance offered to employees
who worked at least 20 hours per week), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3544 (1984); Taylor v. Charley Bros.
Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602, 606 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (part-time employee denied fringe
benefits given to full-time employee); Nollen, supra note 18, at 407 (fewer than 50% of firms sur-
veyed provided part-time employees with supplementary compensation, including health and life
insurance and pensions).
36. Hefferan, supra note 35, at 10.
37. Deutermann & Brown, supra note 20, at 6-7; see also 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 37
(women under 20 years of age are more likely to work part-time than women between 45 and 64).
Among males, however, part-time jobs are held primarily by young persons or persons over 65. In
1977, 68% of male part-time workers were under 22 or over 55 years of age as compared with 42%
of female part-time workers. Barrett, supra note 29, at 85.
38. The voluntary part-time work force contains a somewhat higher percentage of white work-
ers than the full-time work force. In 1977, the proportions of employees working part-time volunta-
rily were 11% for blacks and 15% for whites. Blacks, however, are about twice as likely as whites to
be involuntary part-time workers. Deutermann & Brown, supra note 20, at 6.
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time employees in education and experience, 39 and there appears to be no
shortage of part-time workers at any skill level.4° One researcher has concluded
that part-time workers form a separate, subordinate "queue" in competition
with full-time employees and that they can compete successfully "only when
they have a distinct edge in education, experience and other personal character-
istics that help to predict job performance and training costs."'4'
2. Lack of Unionization
Unions in the United States have paid little attention to part-time workers,
and the resulting lack of unionization among such workers likely contributes to
the pay disparity between part-time and full-time employees.42 Only 7.3 percent
of part-time workers were union members in 1984, compared with 21.5 percent
of full-time workers.43 That unionized work tends to be higher paying is
demonstrated by the fact that female part-time workers covered by union con-
tracts earned fifty percent more than nonunionized female part-time workers in
1977. 44
3. Unequal Pay for Equal Work
A portion of the wage disparity results from part-time workers receiving a
lower rate of pay than full-time workers for the same work.4 5 One researcher
has observed that the wage rate of women part-time workers is usually lower
than that of full-time workers in the same occupation.a 6 Even more significant
than the inequity sometimes found in basic wage rates is the exclusion of part-
time workers from valuable fringe benefits. Despite some recent statutory re-
forms,4 7 it appears that only a small minority of part-time workers receive pro
39. Owen, Why Part-time Workers Tend to Be in Low-wage Jobs, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 11,
13 (June 1978).
40. See Nollen, supra note 18, at 410 ("Employers do not seem to have a problem finding the
particular skill needed for a part-time position from among those available to work part time.").
41. Owen, supra note 39, at 13.
42. See Nollen, supra note 18, at 400-01; Cook, Introduction to WOMEN AND TRADE UNIONS
IN ELEVEN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 9 (A. Cook, V. Lorwin & A. Daniels eds. 1984).
43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
208 (Jan. 1985).
44. Leon & Bednarzik, supra note 22, at 10-11. In 1977, part-time workers not covered by
union contracts earned an average of $2.90 per hour, and unionized part-time employees earned
$4.31 per hour. Id. However, among all workers, sex is more important than union affiliation in
determining wages. In 1979, women in unions earned $4.39 per hour, compared to men, who earned
$7.58 per hour. In the male work force, union members earned 65% more than nonunion members.
In the female work force, union members earned only 27% more than nonunion members. WAGE
AND SALARY DATA, supra note 32, at 5-7.
45. Owen, supra note 39, at 12; see also WOMEN AND WORK, supra note 29, at 27 (1972 survey
found that many part-time workers earned lower hourly wages than employees doing similar full-
time work).
46. Smith, supra note 28, at 44; see also 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 92 (in 1979 women
full-time workers earned an average of $3.98 per hour compared with $3.21 per hour earned by
women part-time workers).
47. See, eg., 5 U.S.C. § 8906(b)(3) (1982) (pro rata health benefits plans for federal part-time
employees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 325.19 (Page Supp. 1984) (pro rata vacation time allowed by
resolution for part-time employees); id. § 3319.14.1 (Page 1980) (pro rata sick leave for part-time
school employees).
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rata fringe benefits comparable to those of full-time employees. 48
4. Undervalued Work and Occupational Segregation
The most significant factor in the wage gap between full-time and part-time
workers is occupational segregation. Part-time work is concentrated in the
wholesale and retail trade and services sectors in which workers tend to be
poorly paid. 49 Almost nine-tenths of all part-time employment is in the services-
producing sector, as compared with approximately two-thirds of full-time
employment.50
The sectors in which part-time opportunities are plentiful also tend to be
female-dominated. Predictably, those industries with the largest concentrations
of women employees are most likely to employ women for part-time jobs.5' To
an even greater degree than the full-time female work force, the part-time female
work force is concentrated in low paying, traditionally female jobs, particularly
in the retail and service sectors. One researcher has noted that "over one-third of
all women with part-time schedules are employed in food service, retail sales,
and private household service occupations." '52
Because part-time employees tend to hold traditionally female jobs, they
share with their full-time female counterparts the persistent byproduct of sex-
based occupational segregation-depressed wages. 53 One analysis estimated
that two-thirds of the wage gap between full- and part-time workers results from
this unfavorable occupational distribution. 54 Another study estimated that if
part-time female workers were to experience only the level of occupational segre-
gation experienced by full-time female workers, over one-third of the wage gap
between female part-time and female full-time workers would be eliminated.5 5
Thus, part-time workers have an even greater stake than full-time female work-
ers in devising mechanisms for reducing occupational segregation and providing
comparable pay for work of comparable value.
48. See supra authorities cited in notes 34-36. Part-time workers also fare poorly when the
state provides compensation. The terms and conditions attached to unemployment compensation
are structurally biased against women, particularly women on part-time schedules. Pearce, Toil and
Trouble: Women Workers and Unemployment Compensation, 10 SIGNS, J. WOMEN IN CULTURE &
Soc'y 439, 443-45 (1985).
49. See 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 37-38 (a general profile of the average female part-
time worker would reveal women performing clerical duties or selling); see also Changing Patterns of
Work in America, 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Poverty, and Migratory
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1976) (most
federal part-time workers in 1973 were clerical workers, and few were supervisors or managers);
Nollen, supra note 18, at 394-400 (discussion of the concentration of part-time workers in the service
and manufacturing industries).
50. Mellor & Stamas, supra note 23, at 21.
51. See Leon & Bednarzik, supra note 22, at 5; Pearce, supra note 48, at 445.
52. Smith, supra note 28, at 44.
53. For discussions of the relationship between occupational segregation and low wages, see
supra authorities cited in note 30.
54. Owen, supra note 39, at 12.
55. Smith, supra note 28, at 44.
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5. Paucity of Desirable Part-Time Jobs
In all industries, part-time work tends to be accorded lower status and less
compensation than full-time work. When a job demands a high level of skill or
supervisory responsibility, the job is not likely to be filled by a part-time worker.
In blue collar jobs, the percentage of part-time workers is lowest for skilled occu-
pations. 56 In white collar occupations, managers are least likely to work part-
time.57 In 1970 only two percent of part-time women workers were managers or
administrators. 58 This figure is low even compared to the five percent of female
full-time workers who held managerial or administrative jobs in 1970.59
6. Negative Employer Perceptions
Negative perceptions of the part-time work force on the part of employers
contribute to the scarcity of desirable part-time jobs and thus exacerbate the
part-time/full-time wage disparity. Employers often stereotype part-time em-
ployees as marginal or unnecessary workers, suitable only for entry level or in-
ferior jobs. 60 This stereotype is reminiscent of views commonly articulated
about the female work force, at least until the feminist reforms of the past
decade. 61
The scant empirical data available do not adequately explain employers'
negative perceptions of part-time employees. 62 Significantly, employers that do
not employ part-time workers tend to have a more negative opinion of the part-
time work force than employers that use part-time workers. 63 This difference in
assessment suggests that the negative perception of part-time workers stems
from unsupported fears rather than from bad experiences.
Admittedly, there may be some special costs that are unique to employing
part-time workers. Employers now pay a federal social security tax on the first
56. Deutermann & Brown, supra note 20, at 8.
57. Id.
58. See Leon & Bednarzik, supra note 22, at 6.
59. See id.
60. See Nollen, supra note 18 at 400; S. REP. No. 1116, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2596, 2599 (discussing Federal Employees Part-Time Career
Employment Act of 1978).
61. For discussions of negative stereotypes associated with women workers, see Hearings on S.
995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
123-29 (1977) (statement of Wendy Williams, Assist. Prof. of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center,
Washington D.C.) (cataloging history of stereotypes hampering women workers from 1908 to 1978);
A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK, A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 231-36 (1982) (analysis of employer attitudes toward women workers in 1920s); N. Mc-
GLEN & K. O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S RIGHTS 224-28 (1983) (discussing cultural stereotypes concern-
ing the abilities of women); Pearce, supra note 48, at 443 ("being a wife was prima facie evidence that
one was a casual or secondary worker"); Pifer, Women Working: Toward A New Society, in WORK-
ING WOMEN AND FAMILIES 13, 23 (K. Feinstein ed. 1979) (prevailing belief among employers is
that women's work attachment is intermittent).
62. The empirical studies on part-time work are reviewed and analyzed in Nollen, supra note
18, in which the authors note that "[t]he empirical evidence comes in the form of a few case studies
and surveys of users. Some of the most informative work is European." Id. at 388.
63. Id. at 400, 402.
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$39,600 earned by each employee. 64 In the rare case in which an employer uses
two part-time employees instead of one full-time employee and the combined
part-time workers' salary exceeds the $39,600 ceiling, the employer's costs will
rise. Similar results may occur with respect to state unemployment costs.65
However, it is highly unlikely that employers are reluctant to use part-time
workers only because of such concrete, additional costs. Instead, many employ-
ers, particularly those employers that do not employ part-time employees, have
a more negative assessment of the value of the part-time work force than experi-
ence warrants.
In some respects, employers regard part-time workers as less desirable than
full-time workers when the evidence suggests that part-time workers actually
perform better. For example, one study disclosed that employers that do not
employ part-time workers generally believe that part-time employees are less
productive than full-time employees and have higher rates of absenteeism. 66
Rather than supporting this negative perception, the available empirical evi-
dence indicates that part-time workers sometimes produce proportionally more
than full-time employees and that the quality of work of part-time employees is
at least as good as that of full-time employees.67 Some commentators have spec-
ulated that the superior productivity of part-time workers may be attributable to
such factors as less fatigue, ability to maintain a faster pace for a shorter time
period, less frustration with tedious or boring tasks, a higher level of concentra-
tion for mentally taxing jobs, and strong motivation to complete tasks within
prescribed time spans. 68 Similarly, although there is conflicting evidence, it ap-
pears that part-time workers have a lower rate of absenteeism than full-time
employees. 69 This favorable attribute of part-time workers is not surprising be-
cause part-time workers have a greater opportunity to attend to personal busi-
ness during nonworking hours.
Employers expect part-time workers to perform less favorably than full-
time workers in other respects even though the evidence indicates that there is
no significant difference in performance between the two groups. For instance,
many employers believe that part-time workers have high rates of turnover. One
study found that two-thirds of employers that did not employ part-time person-
nel expected turnover rates for part-time workers to be higher than those for
full-time employees. 70 Among employers of part-time employees, however,
there was no consensus that part-time workers quit their jobs more frequently
than full-time workers.7 1
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 430 (West Supp. 1985).
65. See Nollen, supra note 18, at 415.
66. See Nollen, Eddy & Martin, Permanent Part Time Employment: The Manager's Perspec-
tive, in Hearing on S. 517, S. 518, H.R. 7-814, H.R. 10126 Before the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 423, 426 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nollen II].
67. See Nollen, supra note 18, at 409-10; REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN & EMPLOYMENT, EXPLOITATION FROM 9 TO 5, at 79 (1975).
68. Nollen, supra note 18, at 409.
69. Id. at 408.
70. Nollen II, supra note 66, at 430.
71. Id.
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Similarly, employers that do not hire part-time personnel expect training
costs for part-time employees to be higher than training costs for full-time em-
ployees.72 Employers of part-time workers, however, generally report no differ-
ence in training costs. 7 3 When there are differences, training costs for part-time
workers are as likely to be lower as they are to be higher than those for full-time
workers.74 The relatively low cost of training part-time workers may result in
part from the fact that many part-time workers hold clerical or blue-collar jobs
for which little or no training is needed. The point is, however, that employer
fears about increased training costs are not supported by available evidence.
Moreover, in those areas in which the use of part-time workers does create
added costs, employers tend to exaggerate or overestimate the amount of the
additional costs. For example, because of the increase in numbers of employees
and greater scheduling complexities, the costs of supervising a part-time work
force may be higher than those associated with an exclusively full-time work
force. In one study, employers of part-time workers reported that supervision of
part-time workers was more difficult in approximately one-half of the cases. 75
In the remaining cases, employers believed that supervision problems for part-
time employees were equivalent to those for full-time employees. 76 Most impor-
tantly, however, very few of the employers that experienced some increased diffi-
culty in supervising part-time workers regarded it as a major cost. 77 In contrast,
nonusers of part-time workers tended both to expect higher supervisory costs for
part-time employees and to regard such costs as an important factor in their
decisions not to create part-time jobs. 78 Similarly, approximately one-third of
the employers of part-time workers reported increased record keeping difficulties
associated with the use of part-time employees.79 When the size of a work force
increases, more records must be kept, and special records may have to be kept
for part-time workers. Only a minority of employers of part-time workers, how-
ever, regarded the increased costs of record keeping as significant. In contrast,
employers that did not use part-time workers were more likely both to expect
increased record keeping costs due to part-time employees and to regard such
costs as important.8 0
In addition to overestimating costs, nonusers of part-time employees may
not appreciate the potential savings that can accompany the use of part-time
personnel. Employers of part-time workers can save the costs of premium over-
72. Id. at 437.
73. Id.
74. Id.




79. Id. at 439.
80. Id. at 438-39. With respect to two more subjective measures of employee performance,
promotability and coworker relationships, part-time workers generally perform as well as full-time
workers. Id. at 433. However, employers of part-time workers were equally split on the issue of the
comparative "loyalty" of part-time and full-time workers. About half the employers surveyed be-
lieved that part-time workers were less loyal or committed to the interests of the business than full-
time workers. Id. at 434.
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time pay that ordinarily must be paid to full-time workers. 81 However, employ-
ers that do not offer part-time positions tend not to expect savings in overtime
pay.82
The studies discussed above suggest that employers' negative attitudes to-
ward the part-time work force cannot be fully explained as a function of verifia-
ble economic costs. The data are inconclusive, however, because it is possible
that given the difference in jobs and work environment, the comparatively nega-
tive assessment of employers that do not employ part-time workers reflects an
accurate prediction in their individual cases.83 Some employers, moreover, may
be deterred from creating part-time jobs because of a conservative management
style that is generally resistant to change. 84 In view of the predominantly female
character of the part-time work force, however, there is reason to suspect that
unproven negative judgments about part-time workers are not traceable solely to
economics or other neutral assessments. Instead, the inferior status of part-time
work is likely also to be rooted in sexism.
II. FEMINISM AND PART-TIME WORK
A. Inattention to the Treatment of the Part-Time Work Force
Our social history should cast a heavy burden of proof on those who blame
the character of a group's members for the unequal economic status of any
group defined significantly by sex, race, religion, or ethnicity. The part-time
work force, which is overwhelmingly female, clearly has been treated less favora-
bly than the full-time work force, which is dominated by men. Existing studies
do not adequately explain the unfavorable treatment in rational economic terms.
Negative stereotypes of part-time workers abound and apparently inhibit the
creation of new part-time jobs. The negative perception of the part-time work
force also underlies the relatively poor treatment of existing part-time
employees.
It is clear that there is no magic to the forty hour workweek. Since 1920,
the number of hours regarded as full-time has dropped appreciably. In the
1920s, for example, it was not uncommon for workers to labor ten hours per
day, six days a week. It was only at the height of the Depression that the forty
hour maximum workweek was instituted.85 One commentator has noted that
the only "constant" about the concept of full-time work is that "it is the stan-
dard amount of time men work." 86
Given the pervasive structural hostility to part-time work, it is curious that
demands for change in the treatment of part-time workers in this country87 have
surfaced so infrequently. To date, there has been no significant attempt to use
81. Id. at 446.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 450.
84. See Owen, supra note 39, at 13.
85. See Blumrosen & Culp, supra note 24, at 410.
86. Greenwald, Part-Time Work When Less is More, 4 Ms. MAG. 41, 42 (May 1976).
87. The treatment of part-time workers has received more attention in the European Economic
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antidiscrimination laws to challenge either the compensation standards for part-
time workers or their lack of access to desirable jobs. Litigants have not yet
invoked the principle of comparable worth to secure pay increases for part-time
workers, despite the predominantly female character of both the part-time work
force and the jobs typically held by part-time workers.
There have been some initiatives outside the courtroom to better the lot of
part-time workers and some scholarly interest in the issue.88 In the period from
1975 to 1978, there was a flurry of articles by labor economists examining the
part-time work force.8 9 The same era spawned modest legislative efforts at the
federal 90 and state levels 91 to encourage part-time work, job sharing92 and flexi-
time. 93 But the topic seems to have lost much of its luster in the 1980s. The
most recent commentary neither focuses on the part-time work force nor identi-
fies it specifically as a target for feminist reform.
The lull in interest in part-time work likely stems from several sources. In
the recent period of high unemployment, 94 the focus has been on the economic
hardships of unemployed full-time workers. In this era, it may appear frivolous,
Community. See Note, Application of the Laws of the EEC and the United Kingdom to Part- Time
Women Workers, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 513 (1985).
88. A notable exception to the lack of scholarly interest in part-time work on the part of the
legal community is Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55, 96-98 (1979) (discussing reformation of part-time work as one desirable
change in the labor market structure).
89. See, eg., Deutermann & Brown, supra note 20; Hedges & Gallogly, supra note 16; Leon &
Bednarzik, supra note 22; Owen, supra note 39.
90. See, eg., Federal Employees Part-Time Career Employment Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3401-
3408 (1982). The Act requires every federal agency to set annual goals and timetables for establish-
ing part-time career employment positions within the federal civil service. The Act also provides
that part-time employees be counted only as fractions of positions for purposes of personnel ceilings.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 3056f (1982) (authorizing the appropriation of federal funds to provide part-
time career opportunities to low income individuals age 55 and older).
Part-time work also received a boost from former President Carter. In 1976 the President
promised that he would "encourage-actively and aggressively-the adoption in the federal govern-
ment and in the private business sector, of flexible working hours for men and women, and ... take
action to increase the availability of part-time jobs, with proper provision for fringe benefits and job
security." Address by President Carter, First Women's Action Agenda, (Nov. 1976), quoted in Ar-
kin & Dobrofsky, Job-Sharing Couples, in WORKING WOMEN AND FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 159,
161.
91. For discussions of state legislative reforms, see Arkin & Dobrofsky, supra note 90, at 161,
and Greenwald, supra note 27, at 184.
92. Job sharing is an arrangement by which married or cohabiting couples share the equivalent
of less than two full-time positions. Arkin & Dobrofsky, supra note 90, at 163.
93. Flexitime permits employees, within designated time periods each day, to choose their start-
ing and ending times at their own discretion. Polit, Nontraditional Work Schedules for Women, in
WORKING WOMEN AND FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 195, 199. A 1977 American Management
Association survey estimated that 12.8% of all private sector organizations use flexitime. 1983
HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 38. In 1979 Congress authorized federal agencies to experiment with
flexible work schedules, including a four day workweek. Act of Sept. 29, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-390,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (92 Stat.) 755, 755-60 (codified in notes following 5 U.S.C.
§ 6101 (1982)). Based on the positive results of these experiments, Congress enacted legislation in
1982 that permits federal agencies to use flexible and compressed employee work schedules on a
nonexperimental basis for three years. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120-6126 (1982).
94. In April 1983 10.3% of all civilian workers were unemployed. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, vol. 30, no. 4, at 60 (Apr. 1983). Part-
time workers suffer higher levels of unemployment than full-time workers. Pearce, supra note 48, at
447.
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or at least politically unwise, to press for improved opportunities for part-time
workers when the principal segment of the work force has fared so poorly.
The conservative political climate of the Nation has also inhibited affirma-
tive action for part-time workers in this decade. Although the 1984 platform of
the Democratic party called for the creation of "meaningful part-time work,"95
the speeches of party leaders embraced the work ethic with a vengeance. Vice-
presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro described the American dream as a
guarantee that "[i]f you work hard and play by the rules, you can earn your
share of America's blessings."' 96 The same sentiment was echoed by keynote
speaker Mario Cuomo, recounting the saga of his immigrant father who, with
calluses on both hands, worked fifteen to sixteen hours a day.97 This appropria-
tion of the work ethic by liberal reformers carries a significant backfire potential.
Employers are likely to find reinforcement for the belief that a hard day's work
is morally enriching as well as economically profitable. The danger for part-time
workers is that if the work ethic is too narrowly defined, they may find them-
selves regarded as only half as worthy as their full-time counterparts. The back-
fire potential results from reinforcement of the stereotype that all part-time
workers lack the ambition and drive needed to become truly successful.
These unfavorable economic and political forces, however, do not explain
why equity for part-time workers has not emerged as a significant component of
the current pay equity or comparable worth movement. Instead, the dormancy
of the part-time work issue requires a more particularized explanation, focusing
on why part-time work has not attained a high priority even on the feminist
reform agenda.
In the public consciousness, the treatment of part-time workers has not
been clearly linked to equal rights for women workers. Despite the similarity
between the negative stereotypes associated with part-time workers and the dis-
credited stereotypes that have hampered women workers generally, acceptance
of the view that part-time status alone justifies unfavorable treatment remains
widespread. The most striking example of the unquestioned acceptance of dis-
crimination against part-time workers is the Department of Labor's creation of a
special exception to the strictures of the Equal Pay Act.98 Under this exception,
employers may pay employees who work twenty or fewer hours a week at a
lower rate of pay than the rate paid to full-time employees doing identical
work.99 Under this system, part-time status automatically justifies unfavorable
treatment, regardless of the productivity or qualifications of part-time
employees.
Two factors likely account for the failure of the public and the legal com-
95. Democratic Party Platform, 1984 CONG. Q. 549, 1767 (1984).
96. Address by Congresswoman Ferraro, Democratic National Convention (July 19, 1984),
reprinted in 1984 CONG. Q. 655, 655 (1984).
97. Address by Governor Cuomo, Democratic National Convention (July 16, 1984), reprinted
in 1984 CONG. Q. 1781, 1784 (1984).
98. See Dep't of Labor Interpretative Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. 800.150 (1982) (discussed infra notes
176-78 and accompanying text).
99. See id.
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munity to regard discrimination against part-time workers as sexism. First, atti-
tudes toward part-time workers mirror attitudes toward working mothers.
Despite recent gains made by women in the job market, the workplace remains
unreceptive to working mothers. Second, feminists, union leaders, and others
interested in liberal reform are often ambivalent about encouraging the growth
of part-time employment. Their ambivalence stems from the fear that the part-
time work force will always retain its minority, second-rate status and will only
perpetuate the inferior position of women workers.
B. Working and Motherhood: Perceptions of Incompatibility
The typical female part-time worker is neither fish nor fowl. She is by defi-
nition squarely in two worlds: she is simultaneously a homemaker and an em-
ployee. Although not all voluntary part-time workers are working mothers, in
the popular consciousness, the part-time worker is a mother whose husband
works full-time. 100
The association of part-time workers with married women, particularly
working mothers, is rooted in history. An early article in the Monthly Labor
Review described the considerable debate about the desirability of creating part-
time jobs for women workers at the close of World War I.101 At that time, there
was particular concern for "the partly occupied woman, the married woman
especially, whose home duties do not occupy her full time but do prevent her
from conforming to the industrial time-table." 10 2
Given this. image of the part-time worker as a "partly occupied" housewife,
it is not surprising that part-time status has been considered marginal or inferior.
Resistance to the view that part-time workers are entitled to rights equal to
those of their full-time counterparts may be traced to a widespread perception
that work within the home (housework) and work done outside the home for
compensation (outside work) are fundamentally different and incompatible.
The dichotomy between housework and outside work is part of a larger
social perception that draws a sharp line between the public and the private
domains. Contemporary feminist scholarship has examined the mechanisms by
which this ideological division between public and private spheres reinforces the
social inequality of women. 10 3 One characteristic of the public/private split is a
perceived difference in modes of interpersonal interaction. Professor Frances
100. See supra authorities cited in note 29.
101. Women in the Modern World, in ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCIENCE
(Bureau of Women in Industry of New York, May 1929) (reprinted in Women in Industry-Part-
Time Jobs for Women, 1929 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1259) [hereinafter cited as Women in Industry].
102. Id. The article acknowledged, however, that other classes of employees might benefit from
part-time employment, including "single women with household duties which do not fill their time,
students working their way, women whose health does not permit full employment, and those who
already have one part-time job and want another to supplement it." Id.
103. See, eg., Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY 32-34 (1984); Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1501-13
(1983); Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 294, 298-300 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982); Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 55, 70-102; Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 117, 118-39.
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Olsen has observed that the public sectors of the market and government are
generally thought to be animated by individualistic, self-interested behavior in
which the common good is to be achieved by individuals striving to get ahead.
In the public world, competition is the key to success. 1°4 In marked contrast,
the private world of the family is characterized by cooperation rather than com-
petition. The "successful" family member sacrifices his or her own desires for
the good of other family members and derives principal satisfaction from shar-
ing rather than from eliminating competitors. 10 5 These patterns of sharing and
cooperation that characterize the family have been linked to a mode of behavior
said to reflect a distinctive female morality.10 6
This social perception of the dichotomy between public and private life
pressures each working woman to choose whether to be a "career woman" or a
"working mother." These descriptive titles suggest the relative dominance given
to the public or private sphere in the individual woman's life. The career woman
may have a husband and children, but she places her job first and, by definition,
is a full-time worker. The working mother, as her title suggests, is a mother and
wife first and foremost. She works only to supplement the family income, to
relieve boredom, or to sharpen her skills for the future. Her commitment to the
job is seen as divided and lukewarm. She may work full-time or part-time. If
she works full-time, she likely works in a traditionally female job.
All part-time workers are lumped into this second, "working mother" cate-
gory. The very choice to work part-time excludes a total commitment to the job.
This rigid conception means that a "part-time career woman" is simply an
impossibility.
Likewise, in this traditional conception of home and work, there is no such
creature as the "working father." It is simply not acceptable for a man to work
part-time voluntarily. There is no need for the term "career man." To be a man
is to put the job first and family concerns second. All working men are career
men in this simplistic scheme.
This traditional sex-based conception of the home and of compensated
work done outside the home is reflected in the data generated by opinion polls
measuring the public's attitudes about the employment of married women.
Although public attitudes have fluctuated somewhat over time, there is a persis-
tent double standard in the public's view of the proper role of married men and
married women in the workplace.
In their book, Women's Rights,'0 7 Professors Nancy McGlen and Karen
O'Connor summarize extensive public opinion data. Essentially, the data reveal
that the once generalized hostility toward married women working outside the
home has decreased markedly. A more refined double standard, however, has
104. See Olsen, supra note 103, at 1520-21.
105. Id. at 1505.
106. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (in resolving moral questions
women often focus on care and responsibility toward others); Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and
the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 37-49 (1985) (panel discussion) (elaborating on
Gilligan's thesis).
107. N. MCGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra note 61.
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emerged. The current majority opinion now acknowledges the right of a mar-
ried woman to work outside the home but only if her employment does not
conflict with the perceived needs or interests of her husband or young
children. 108
Until fairly recently, there was widespread hostility toward married women
working outside the home under any circumstances. t0 9 Resentment and disap-
proval of working wives reached a high point during the Depression. One histo-
rian describes that era as a time when "[tihe question of whether the roles of
worker and of wife/mother were not mutually exclusive was on everybody's
lips." 10 In 1936 only fifteen percent of the public unqualifiedly endorsed mar-
ried women working.1 11 At that time, there was considerable support for the
practice of firing or refusing to hire women who could look to their husbands for
support.' 12 For example, over half the respondents in one study favored legisla-
tion prohibiting married women from working for state or local governments if
their husbands earned at least $1000 a year.1 13
During World War II, there was much greater support for the employment
of married women. The public approval of married women working, spawned
by the war, however, was temporary and dissipated in the immediate post-war
era. 114 Public opinion remained similar to public opinion before the war--only
eighteen percent of those polled in the immediate post-war era gave unqualified
support to the employment of married women if their husbands could support
their families." 15
Although large numbers of married women entered the work force in the
1950s,116 attitudes concerning the employment of married women did not begin
to change until the late 1960s. Changed economic needs and the rebirth of the
women's movement fostered more liberal attitudes toward manied women and
work. In 1969 over half the persons surveyed approved of married women earn-
ing money outside the home.' 17 By the late 1970s, the vast majority of the pub-
lic had accepted a married woman's right to work outside the home, even if her
husband were capable of supporting her.1 8
108. See Levin, Comparable Worth: The Feminist Road to Socialism, 14 COMMENTARY 13, 15
(1984).
109. As one early commentator observed:
First, it is said that a married woman's place is in her home, that if she takes outside
work she must inevitably neglect either the home or the business, and that having elected
matrimony, it is obligatory upon her to fulfill the duties of that estate, leaving the pursuit of
economic independence to her unmarried sisters.
Women in Industry, supra note 101, at 1262.
110. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 61, at 255.




115. Id. at 215-16.
116. See id. at 167, 216 (demand for women workers during this period was too great to be filled
by single women alone).
117. See id. at 217 ("[B]y 1969, 55 percent of all respondents approved of a married woman
earning money in business or industry, an increase of 37 percent since 1945.").
118. Id.
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Despite increased support for married women's employment, the public
continues to adhere to a double standard that discriminates against two sub-
classes of married women. First, when the career interest of a married woman is
pitted against that of her husband, the public continues to view the man's inter-
est as superior. The most recent polling data for 1985 revealed that seventy-two
percent of all women and sixty-two percent of all men believed that a woman
should quit her job if her husband were offered a very good job in another
city.119 However, if a woman were offered a better job in another city, over one-
half of the respondents believed that she should refuse the job and stay in her
present location to allow her husband to remain in his job. 120
Professors McGlen and O'Connor inferred from similar results in public
polling data generated in the late 1970s' 21 that "most people still believe that a
married woman should accept a job outside of the home only if she is not taking
a job away from a man."' 122 For example, when respondents in a 1977 poll were
told that there was a "limited number of jobs," sixty-four percent disapproved of
a married woman holding a job if her husband could support her. 123 In a simi-
lar vein, a 1976 poll revealed that over one-third of the respondents favored
laying off married women before other employees. 124
In addition to regarding a husband's career as more important than that of
his wife, the public views the employment interests of married women as
subordinate to the interests of their young children. In 1978, for example, only
twenty-three percent of the public disagreed with the statement that women
with young children should not work outside the home unless it were financially
necessary.' 25 The hostility toward mothers of young children working is partly
explained by the perception that young children are hurt when their mothers
work. In 1977 seventy-three percent of all men interviewed and sixty-two per-
cent of all women interviewed felt that preschool children suffered if their
mothers worked. 126
119. Opinion Roundup, PUB. OPINION, Dec.-Jan. 1986, at 26. The same poll revealed that only
10% of women and 19% of men believed that a husband should refuse a very good job in another
city to enable his wife to remain in her present job. Id.
120. Id.
121. In 1979 77% of all women and 68% of all men believed that a woman should give up her
career if her husband were required to relocate. Two-thirds of the respondents in another poll be-
lieved that a woman should give up a promotion if it would require the spouses to relocate. N.
McGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra note 61, at 218.
122. Id. at 217.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 217-18.
125. Id. at 222.
126. Id. Similarly, in a 1984 poll 55% of the respondents believed that if both parents work, the
family generally suffers. Opinion Roundup, supra note 119, at 31.
There is a great gulf between public opinion and reality regarding the employment of mothers of
preschool children. A high percentage of mothers with preschool children work. " 'The largest
proportional increases in labor force participation have occurred among mothers with children
under six years old."' U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CHILD CARE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
FOR WOMEN 8 (1981) (quoting CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, CHILDREN
AND PRESCHOOL: OPINIONS FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT 44 (1978)) [hereinafter cited as CHILD CARE
AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY]. From 1970 to 1981, the labor force participation rates of married
mothers with children under six years of age increased from 30% to 48%, a greater increase than
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Like most sex-based stereotypes, the double standard applied to working
mothers and fathers is reinforced by the real world. There is evidence indicating
that it indeed may be more difficult for a woman to manage a job and a family
than it is for a man. The feminist movement has not yet freed women from
shouldering a disproportionate burden of both housework and childrearing re-
sponsibilities. In a 1985 poll, men and women agreed that husbands only rarely
did as much or more household work as their wives. 127 One study found, for
example, that women with outside jobs devoted an average of twenty-eight to
fifty-six hours per week to housework and child care. 128 In contrast, men spent
only an average of ten and one-half hours per week performing these services. 129
Because women spend more time cooking,' 30 cleaning, caring for their children,
and shopping for their families, they may have less time available for work-
ing.'3 1 A report of the United States Civil Rights Commission indicated, for
example, that twenty-three percent of working mothers reported that inadequate
child care arrangements caused them to miss or be late for work. Few fathers
complained of the same problem.' 32
Because the female part-time worker presumably has more flexibility to ar-
range her schedule to accommodate family responsibilities, she should be less
subject to charges of conflicting loyalties than her full-time counterpart. How-
ever, this logic has not dispelled negative perceptions about part-time workers.
Indeed, part-time workers may be more vulnerable to sex-based discrimination
than full-time female employees. This is the case because the feminist movement
and the laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment have had at least one
important impact: it is no longer respectable for an employer openly to assert
that a woman will be a less productive worker simply because she is a woman, or
is married, or has children. As yet, however, this chilling effect has not filtered
that for mothers with school-age children. 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 17. There is no
convincing evidence that children usually suffer because their mothers work. See Moore & Hofferth,
Women and Their Children, in THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION, supra note 29, at 125, 143-52 (because
children, families, and types of day care vary widely, the effect of substitute care on children depends
on several factors); Smith, The Movement of Women into the Labor Force, in THE SUBTLE REVOLU-
TION, supra note 29, at 1, 24 ("Overall the evidence does not suggest that day care harms children.").
127. Only 15% of the women and 23% of the men surveyed reported that men performed at
least half of the household tasks. Opinion Roundup, supra note 119, at 30.
128. Law, Women, Work Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249,
1331 (1983) (citing Walker & Gauger, The Dollar Value of Household Work, NYS SCH. OF HUMAN
ECOLOGY, CORNELL UNIV. INFORMATION BULL. 60 (1973)); see also N. McGLEN & K.
O'CONNOR, supra note 61, at 350-52 (reviewing empirical studies and attitudes toward sharing of
tasks between men and women); Hofferth & Moore, Women's Employment and Marriage, in THE
SUBTLE REVOLUTION, supra note 29, at 99, 115 (noting that when both partners work full-time, the
workweek of wives, including jobs and housework, averages 66 to 75 hours and exceeds that of
husbands by about 8 hours).
129. Law, supra note 128, at 1331.
130. A 1984 survey found that men are the primary cooks in only 4% of American households
and cooking is shared equally in 15% of households. In households with children, men are primary
cooks in only 2% of the cases and cooking is shared equally in 24% of the cases. N.Y. Times, Feb.
12, 1986, at C8, col. 3.
131. See discussions of women's double burden in N. McGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra note 61,
at 241, and Powers, supra note 103, at 86.
132. CHILD CARE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 126, at 12 (discussed in Law, supra
note 128, at 1310).
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down to salvage the image of the part-time worker. Because overt prejudice
against part-time workers is not clearly associated with sexism, it has not lost its
respectability.
Perhaps adverse treatment of part-time employees has not been linked to
sexism because male part-time workers have also been disadvantaged. The fact
that discriminatory treatment of part-time workers does not have its sole impact
on women, however, does not render such discrimination gender-neutral. Our
understanding of the complex mechanisms by which the system-wide inequality
of women is maintained now includes the recognition that many harmful sexist
practices and institutions may directly and simultaneously disadvantage men as
well as women. Thus, for example, a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions invalidated social security and other benefit schemes that accorded less
protection to the male survivors of women workers than to the surviving wives
of similarly situated deceased male workers. 133 These schemes were recognized
as double-edged swords, discriminating simultaneously and directly against de-
ceased women workers and their surviving husbands. 134 Moreover, it is now
commonly acknowledged that the low wages and low status traditionally associ-
ated with predominantly female occupations and jobs harm men as well as wo-
men who work in those fields. 135 A particularly interesting example of this
phenomenon can be found in the academic world, in which scholarship in wo-
men's studies is downgraded and viewed as less acceptable even when pursued
by a male scholar or teacher.136 Thus, in practical operation, sexist practices
may not be refined so as to target women as the only direct victims. Certain men
may also be disadvantaged by the sexist structure of the workplace. 137
The low status of the part-time worker is likely related to the low value our
society places on housework and child care. 13  Because the stereotypical female
133. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (workers' compensation);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (social security); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (social security); cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating law authorizing payment of
alimony to women only).
134. For general discussions of the benign sex discrimination cases, see Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978); Kanowitz,
"Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379 (1980).
135. The National Research Council estimated that men doing "women's work" could expect to
earn nearly $3,000 less per year than men doing "men's work." WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra
note 30, at 28-29 n.13. Moreover, the more intensely the occupation was dominated by women, the
greater the disparity in wages for both men and women workers. The National Research Council
study estimated that each additional percent of female workers in an occupation costs male workers
about $30 in annual income. Id. However, even in female-dominated occupations, men tend to earn
more than women. Rytina, Earnings of Men and Women: A Look at Specific Occupations, 105
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25, 26-28 (Apr. 1982).
136. In Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 823 (1982), a female professor challenged a denial of tenure based on an alleged deficiency in
her scholarship in women's studies. Id. at 1344. The district court determined that the peer criti-
cism of Lynn's work reflected a "disdain" for women's studies which might have been prompted by a
belief that "woman's [sic] studies was an unworthy topic to pursue." Id. at 1343.
137. Similarly, it is evident that discrimination against racial minorities may harm a subclass of
whites. The theory underlying disparate impact analysis in Title VII litigation implicitly recognizes
that discriminatory practices may disadvantage individuals of the majority group. Many selection
devices that are invalid because of their disproportionate harm to blacks operate as barriers to indi-
vidual whites as well.
138. See, e.g., Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17
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part-time worker spends part of her day on domestic chores, she may be tainted
at work because of what she does at home. As long as domestic work is not seen
as productive, worthy of pay, or intellectually or physically taxing, its low social
worth stigmatizes the homemaker, even when she is employed at an outside job.
The employer is unlikely to believe that it will benefit from the domestic exper-
iences of part-time workers. Moreover, the employer may regard the part-time
worker as suitable only for jobs that most resemble housework and child care.
This enforced compatibility between outside work and work done at home may
well justify placement of part-time workers into low-skilled, boring, traditionally
female jobs. 139 Moreover, insofar as family life is viewed as anticompetitive and
communal, the working mother may be regarded as psychologically unready to
compete in the marketplace. Until the working mother sheds her association
with the home by agreeing to work full-time, she may be hampered by belittling
conceptions of her life away from the job.
C. Perpetuation of Male Dominance in the Two-Parent Family
Discrimination against part-time workers may properly be viewed as sexist
because of its capacity to perpetuate male dominance in two-parent homes. The
typical part-time working mother may be kept in a subordinate economic posi-
tion by a workplace that is inhospitable to part-time workers. Unless she is
willing and able to work full-time, there is little chance that she will achieve
economic parity with her husband. Spouses are unlikely to decide that they will
each work part-time and share child care and other domestic work equally.
Equally slim is the possibility that the man will opt for part-time work and the
woman will maintain a full-time job. Instead, the marketplace is structured to
induce the woman in the two parent family to be the sole part-time worker.
Men typically earn much more than their wives when each is a full-time
worker. 140 Thus, it is rarely rational for a husband to give up his full-time job.
Moreover, because part-time workers receive low pay, 14 1 the price a man pays
for switching to part-time work includes the premium he formerly received as a
full-time male worker. Thus, a male worker who decides to work part-time re-
ceives the same unfavorable treatment as a female part-time worker and loses
the edge given his sex in the marketplace. Finally, the social prejudice against
"househusbands" likely presents a formidable obstacle to men working part-
time, even when the family income would not suffer dramatically from this
FAM. L.Q. 41, 43-44 (1983) (inability to ascertain economic value of a homemaker's activity results
in minimization of the value of her work effort); Hauserman & Fethke, Valuation of Homemaker's
Services, 1978 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 249, 250 (noting possible reluctance to assign a monetary value
to a mother's services in a wrongful death action); Nelson, The Unpriced Services of the Unpaid
Homemaker, 52 AM. VOCATIONAL J. 36, 36-38 (Oct. 1977) (dollar value of household work ignored
when determining GNP).
139. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 9-12 (1979).
140. See CONSUMER RESEARCH CENTER, THE WORKING WOMAN-A PROGRESS REPORT 6-7
(1984) (working wives contribute a little over a quarter of the family's total income); see also 1983
HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 92 (in 1979 male full-time workers earned an average hourly wage of
$6.25, compared with $3.98 for female full-time workers).
141. See 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 92 (in 1979 male part-time workers earned $3.20
per hour compared with $3.21 per hour earned by female part-time workers).
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choice. 142 It is now recognized that work done in the home is undervalued and
that women who work at home and care for children are frequently dismissed as
economic inferiors. The reputation of househusbands may be even worse. For
example, one study of attitudes among high school seniors revealed that, even
among those who indicated support for the employment of married women, only
a few found it as much as "somewhat acceptable" for a husband not to work or
to work only part-time, even if his wife was employed.1 43 These economic and
social pressures tend to preserve the predominantly female character of the part-
time work force, increasing the chance that even the employed woman will re-
main economically dependent on her husband.
That the low status of part-time workers contributes to the economic subor-
dination of wives living with their husbands seems characteristic of the second
generation of sexism. In the first generation, explicit disparate treatment of all
women workers was justified as the natural order of things. Although the old
sexist notions have been discredited and explicit sex-based discrimination has
decreased, the system of male dominance has not been seriously undermined.
Today the system tolerates and purports to treat equally those career women
who declare themselves independent and enter the marketplace on ostensibly the
same terms and conditions as men. However, when the employed woman devi-
ates from the male norm, for example, by working at a traditionally female job
or working only part-time, her second class status is likely to persist. The public
opinion data surveyed above 144 concerning attitudes towards employment of
married women support this observation. Although the undifferentiated hostil-
ity toward the employment of married women has decreased, the public contin-
ues to subordinate the interests of married women to those of their husbands and
young children. Being married may no longer automatically deprive a woman
of equal rights in the workplace, but the position of certain subclasses of married
working women remains precarious because their interest in employment is
viewed as less weighty than that of other workers.
The prejudice against part-time workers thus may stem from a more subtle
sexist attitude that, without purporting to denigrate women per se, discounts
and devalues the interests of women who are viewed as competing with men.
Insofar as the part-time worker is equated to the working mother whose hus-
band is employed full-time, the unfavorable treatment of the part-time worker is
discounted as relatively harmless on the ground that the family suffers less when
discrimination is directed at the secondary, rather than at the primary, bread-
winner. By classifying part-time workers as second string employees, disparate
treatment is justified on a superficially neutral basis. According second-class
status to part-time workers also ensures that they do not attain the status of
primary or even equal breadwinners entitled to equal respect. A woman who
decides to work part-time effectively loses her right to claim equal treatment. 1 45
142. See Greenwald, supra note 27, at 185 (not yet "socially acceptable" for men to work part-
time).
143. N. MCGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra note 61, at 224.
144. See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
145. A similar "sophisticated" pattern of second generation sexism has been researched and
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In addition, discrimination against part-time workers protects male domi-
nance in the home. Single mothers rarely have the luxury of working part-
time.1 46 A woman living with her husband is a likely candidate for part-time
work and thus a likely candidate for discrimination. Discrimination against
part-time workers targets an important subclass of women who are rendered
incapable of attaining economic independence and thus must continue to depend
on their husbands' jobs. Discrimination against part-time workers keeps wives
in a subordinate economic position in an era in which overt sex discrimination is
widely condemned.
D. Debating Strategies for Reform
The inferior status of part-time workers is part of the larger problem of the
inferior position of women workers in the hierarchy of the workplace. Reform
efforts designed to better the lot of women workers will almost invariably have a
positive impact on the predominantly female part-time work force. Thus, the
basic strategic question is whether to focus on part-time work directly as a target
for reform.
The benefits of such a direct strategy, if successful, are self-evident. First,
women currently holding part-time jobs would receive increased pay and ex-
panded fringe benefits. Second, women currently not in the labor force because
of the scarcity of part-time jobs could find suitable part-time work. Third, wo-
men working full-time "involuntarily" could switch to part-time schedules and
have more time for parenting or other tasks. Last, men who work full-time ox
are unemployed might find it feasible and desirable to work part-time and par-
ticipate more fully in childrearing and other activities. The ultimate goal of such
a strategy would be to upgrade and sexually integrate the part-time work force.
The principal beneficial byproducts of such reform would be to encourage men
and women to share domestic responsibilities equally and to weaken the male's
traditional dominance in the marital relationship.
A direct strategy to reform part-time work, however, has significant back-
fire potential.1 47 The danger'stems from the reality that part-time work, like
traditional female work, is characterized by low pay and low status. Moreover,
analyzed by Professor Sylvia Law. See Law, supra note 128. In her article, Professor Law made
sense of a perverse federal regulatory scheme that required single mothers of school age children
receiving Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) to seek work outside the home. Act of
June 9, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, 460-62 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(19)(A)), amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2314, 95 Stat. 854, 854-55
(1981) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1982)). The law exempted AFDC mothers from
having to seek outside work if their husbands lived with them. The "sense" of the system was that
women were freed to take care of their husbands in the home and thereby encouraged not to work
when the "primary breadwinner" was present. Professor Law explained that single mothers did not
get similar encouragement, simply because when "there is no man in the home, there is no need to
protect his economic dominance." Law, supra note 128, at 1266.
146. Of the widowed, divorced, or separated women who worked in 1981, 13.5% worked part-
time voluntarily, compared with 80% who worked full-time. 1983 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 37.
Of the employed married women with husbands present in 1981, 24% worked part-time voluntarily,
compared with 70.8% who worked full-time. Id.
147. See Arkin & Dobrofsky, supra note 90, at 174 (feminists fear that part-time work is poten-
tially destructive of women's efforts for equal employment).
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despite its overwhelmingly female composition, the part-time work force com-
prises only a minority of women workers. Most women workers work full-
time.148 Thus, reforms targeted at the part-time work force affect only a minor-
ity of women workers whose place in the hierarchy of work is particularly low.
The problems of predominantly black colleges and universities provide a
useful analogy to the problems of the part-time workforce. 149 Predominantly
black educational institutions typically suffer from low prestige in academic cir-
cles and may not attract large numbers of nonminority students.15 0 Despite the
significant impact these schools have on the lives of minority students, some civil
rights proponents argue that reform efforts directed at predominantly black in-
stitutions are futile and ultimately self defeating. 151 The principal strategy for
ending racial discrimination has been to encourage minority students to attend
formerly white institutions and to put pressure on these institutions to create an
environment that is hospitable to minority students. Given limited resources, it
may be more efficient to reshape the dominant institutions than to upgrade the
minority institutions. If the segregated character of a minority institution is
partly responsible for its low status, there is a danger that reforms will not suc-
ceed in changing the racial character of the school and, at most, will bring lim-
ited, temporary gains to students currently enrolled.
Efforts to reform part-time work involve similar problems. If such efforts
are limited to upgrading the pay of part-time workers, the most serious concern
is that the efforts may result in a shrinkage of part-time opportunities. 152 If
reforms are designed both to upgrade pay and to encourage the creation of new
part-time jobs, the success of the strategy will depend on two variables: the
kinds of new part-time jobs created and the response of male workers to these
new part-time opportunities. In the worst scenario, the net effect of reform
would result only in the creation of additional, relatively low-paying part-time
jobs in traditionally female fields. Because few male workers would accept such
148. Of all female employees in all occupation groups in 1981, 71.8% worked full-time, and
28.2% worked part-time. 2 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN
2163, MARITAL AND FAMILY PATTERNS OF WORKERS: AN UPDATE (May 1983).
149. The popularity of historically black colleges has declined in recent years. The percentage of
black students attending these schools dropped from 51% in 1964 to 18% in 1976. H.E.W. NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM. ON BLACK HIGHER EDUC. & BLACK COLLEGES & UNIVS., HIGHER EDUCATION
EQUITY: THE CRISIS OF APPEARANCE VERSUS REALITY 13 (1978).
150. The typical traditionally black college has a nonminority enrollment of approximately
28%. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON BLACK HIGHER EDUC. AND BLACK COLLEGES & UNIVS.,
NEEDED SYSTEMS SUPPORTS FOR ACHIEVING HIGHER EDUCATION EQUITY FOR BLACK AMERI-
CANS 190-93 (1980) (state and regional statistics).
151. But cf. Bell, Black Colleges and the Desegregation Dilemma, 28 EMORY L.J. 949, 962 (1979)
(disagreeing with reformers who conclude that black colleges are "inconsistent with the ideal of a
racially integrated society").
152. The argument is commonly made that the marketplace resists reform efforts, resulting in
worsened circumstances for the disadvantaged. See Olsen, supra note 103, at 1503 (discussing twin
arguments that the market will resist reforms, either because of its fragility or its durability). Oppo-
nents of the Equal Pay Act expressed a similar fear, claiming that granting equal pay to full-time
women workers would worsen, rather than improve, job opportunities for women. See H.R. REP.
No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 687, 692(additional minority view of Congressman Findley). Congressman Findley opined that "[a]lthough
[the Equal Pay Act] may have motives in the finest tradition of gallantry, it actually is about as
ungallant as a kick in the shins." Id.
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jobs, part-time work would likely remain women's work. If this were the case,
the workplace might become even more deeply segregated by sex.
Aside from the fear of deepening segregation, an increase in part-time jobs
could conceivably pose a threat to the full-time work force. In the past, union
leaders have been reluctant to endorse the creation of new part-time jobs.1 5 3
Unions fear that an increase in part-time jobs could depress the wages of full-
time workers and that, in times of high unemployment, part-time workers could
take jobs away from full-time workers.1 5 4 Looking at the part-time work force
as a source of cheap, docile labor, the unions' chief concern is with possible
exploitation of this growing labor market by management.
Finally, there is a danger that the availability of increased part-time oppor-
tunities for women workers might reinforce societal attitudes that women should
have primary responsibility for child care and housework and should not be
expected to devote the same time and effort to careers as do men. As long as the
part-time work force remains predominantly female, employers and others may
be led to believe that only women experience conflicts in carrying out their do-
mestic and career roles.
As the preceding discussion indicates, the part-time work problem is com-
plex. Simply expanding the number of part-time jobs will do little to better the
position of women in the labor force. 155 To be effective, a reform strategy must
address the quality as well as the quantity of part-time opportunities. Upgrading
pay and fringe benefits in current part-time positions is one obvious target of
reform. The creation of new part-time jobs in fields that are not traditionally
female clearly also warrants attention.
A reform strategy aimed both at pay equity and at broadening opportuni-
ties for part-time work in traditionally male-dominated jobs should dispel fears
that reform could actually worsen the plight of women workers. Whether the
reform of part-time work is so important that it should become a major focus for
feminist efforts to reform the workplace, however, depends on the likely success
of alternative reform strategies. The conflict between childrearing and career,
for example, could be addressed by changes affecting the entire work force, such
as shortening the normal work week. 156 Alternatively, reform could focus more
narrowly on working parents only. For example, parents of young children
could be given special privileges, such as parenting leaves 1 57 and subsidized
153. See Nollen, supra note 18, at 416.
154. See id.; see also Polit, supra note 93, at 203 (union leader argues that part-time workers
displace full-time workers).
155. See Smith, supra note 28, at 45.
156. See Blumrosen & Culp, supra note 24 (advocating shorter workweek); see also INT'L LABOR
OFFICE, WORLD LABOR REPORT, in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at A-4 (Jan. 1, 1985) (world-
wide trend is toward workweek of fewer than 40 hours and longer vacations); E. MEEHAN, WO-
MEN'S RIGHTS AT WORK 189 (1985) (reduced workweek would blur the distinction between part-
time and full-time workers).
157. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) (employer must grant reasonable
unpaid maternity leave up to four months); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) (West Supp.
1984) (employer must grant reasonable leave of absence for pregnancy disability); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-2-310 to -311 (1985) (employer must give reasonable leave of absence). This type of
legislation requires special, favorable treatment of employed mothers, beyond the Title VII prohibi-
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child care.'58 Like reforms targeting the part-time work force, however, these
strategies have potentially significant drawbacks for women. Widespread reform
aimed at all workers is likely to be politically infeasible and may do little to
change the relative positions of men and women, either at home or at work.
Programs aiding only parents of young children may be unfair to other workers
with pressing needs that are not similarly accommodated. In addition, govern-
ment subsidies given only to parents tend to reinforce the belief that legislators
have a legitimate interest in influencing the procreative choices of individuals.
This belief has proven harmful to women's interests in the past.' 5 9
In the final analysis the political wisdom of reform efforts directed at part-
time workers is confirmed by the continued desirability of part-time work to
women workers. 160 Despite current disadvantages of part-time work, women
have not been deterred from seeking part-time jobs. 161 Although we cannot
know with certainty what employment choices women would make absent ine-
quality in the job market, it is reasonable to assume that a significant number of
women and men would wish to work part-time, at least for a portion of their
working lives. Moreover, when the demands of parenting are particularly acute,
part-time work may be the least drastic means by which the competing needs of
family and career can be accommodated. Unpaid parenting leaves may not be
economically feasible for a family with limited income. In more financially se-
cure families, parents may be reluctant to take lengthy leaves of absence, either
because of ties to particular jobs or unwillingness to care for children on a full-
time basis. For a host of practical reasons, it is unlikely that the desire for mean-
ingful part-time work will abate, particularly among women in the labor force.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND PART-TIME WORKERS
Currently, part-time workers are afforded only limited protection under the
two principal statutory schemes prohibiting sex discrimination in employment.
Although part-time workers technically are covered under both the Equal Pay
tion of unequal treatment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). Many groups, including the American
Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization for Women, and the League of Women Voters,
advocate extending such legislation to parents of either sex. See Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner,
692 P.2d 1243, 1253 (Mont. 1984) (court rejected these groups' argument that State maternity leave
statute should be extended to men). According to a recent study by Bernard Hodes Advertising,
about half of the firms surveyed pay their female employees on maternity leave full salary, but only
two percent of the firms offer paid paternity leave to male employees. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
44, at A-4 (Mar. 3, 1985).
158. The principal support for child care at the federal level now takes the form of a tax credit
for expenses of child care, which parents may claim if they work or go to school. 26 U.S.C.A. § 21
(Supp. 1986).
159. See Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196-97 & n.118 (1982).
160. See Nollen, supra note 18, at 402 (listing women's organizations supporting federal part-
time career legislation).
161. The number of female part-time workers 20 years of age and older almost doubled from
1965 to 1982, increasing from 4,371,000 to 8,777,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DaP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 410 (104th ed. 1984). During the
same period, the number of female full-time workers 20 years of age and older increased at a lesser
rate, from 18,260,000 to 31,897,000. Id.
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Act (EPA)16 2 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),163 courts
and enforcement agencies have tended to interpret these statutes in a restrictive
manner that legitimates the inferior status of part-time workers. An exception
to the EPA allows employers to pay some part-time workers lower wages than
full-time workers performing identical jobs.1 6 4 Under Title VII, most courts
have been reluctant to declare that lower pay scales for predominantly female
jobs constitute actionable sex discrimination. 165 This hesitation to embrace a
theory of comparable worth presents a formidable obstacle to narrowing wage
disparities for many part-time workers. The following two sections of this Arti-
cle review existing legal doctrines and advocate reinterpretation of antidis-
crimination laws to advance the goals of pay equity and equal opportunity for
part-time workers.
A. The Equal Pay Act-Existing Doctrine
1. Basic Elements of an Equal Pay Act Claim
The EPA prohibits discriminatory payment of lower wages to women who
perform work substantially equal to work performed by men.166 To state a
prima facie case under the EPA, a claimant must prove that her job is substan-
tially equal 167 to that of a male worker 168 who receives a higher wage 16 9 in the
162. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). Under the EPA, any employer subject to the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-261 (1982), must refrain from
paying female employees unequal wages for equal work. The EPA also extends to executive, admin-
istrative, and professional employees who are exempted from FLSA coverage for most purposes. See
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 437-38 (2d ed. 1983). The
courts have uniformly construed the EPA to cover part-time workers. See, e.g., Lanegan-Grimm v.
Library Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983); EEOC v. School Bd., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,330 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem. sub nom. Marshall v. School Bd., 661 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1981).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Title VII protects any "individual" against discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin at the hands of a covered employer. See id.
§ 2000e(c). With a few specified exceptions, any employer with 15 or more employees is covered.
See id. § 2000e(b). As affected "individuals," part-time employees of covered employers are pro-
tected. See, ,eg., Mecklenburg v. Montana State Bd. of Regents, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
11,438 (D. Mont. 1976); Hodgson v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Pa. 1971). See
generally 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.32(a) (1984) (discussing
conditions under which part-time employees are covered by Title VII). The courts have even been
willing to consider part-time workers "employees" for purposes of satisfying the 15 employee juris-
dictional requisite. See, eg., Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936
(D. Colo. 1979); Stratton v. Drumm, 445 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Conn. 1978); Pascutoi v. Washburn-
McReavy Mortuary, Inc., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1325 (D. Minn. 1975).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 175-86.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 296-313.
166. The EPA provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate,
within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working conditions ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
167. The EPA claimant must show only that the jobs being compared are substantially equal,
not identical. Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970). To determine whether jobs are substantially equal, courts look primarily to the four statu-
tory factors of equal skill, effort, responsibility, and similar working conditions. For discussions of
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same establishment. 170 Many part-time workers could probably make this
prima facie showing. The data indicate that part-time status alone accounts for
some of the pay disparity between full-time and part-time workers. 17 1 One prac-
tical problem that part-time workers may encounter in stating prima facie cases
is the lack of clear legal authority holding that an employer's payment of lower
fringe benefits to part-time workers constitutes lower wages under the EPA. 172
the cases analyzing these four factors, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN supra note 162, at 443-59;
Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking a Prima Facie Case, 31 ARK. L. REV.
545, 559-83 (1978). Skill is defined by the Department of Labor to include "consideration of such
factors as experience, training, education and ability. It must be measured in terms of the perform-
ance requirements of the job." 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1985). "Effort is concerned with the measure-
ment of the physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of a job." Id. § 800.127.
Responsibility is "concerned with the degree of accountability required in the performance of the
job, with emphasis on the importance of the job obligation." Id. § 800.129. Similar working condi-
tions relate to surroundings and hazards encountered on the job. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188, 202 (1974).
168. The few cases that have focused on the plaintiff's initial burden to demonstrate sex bias in
pay rates require only a showing of individual adverse impact, i.e., the existence of at least one male
employee in the defendant's establishment who receives higher pay than the female plaintiff. See,
eg., Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1984) (man claiming sex bias); Futran v.
Ring Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Sullivan, supra note 167, at 555-59 (discuss-
ing prima facie burden with regard to sex discrimination). Many EPA claimants, however, present
much stronger prima facie cases by showing group adverse impact, i.e., that female employees as a
group are paid at a lower rate than male employees. See, e.g., EEOC v. Central Kansas Medical
Center, 705 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 312 (1985); Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 270-71 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Marshall v. A & M Consol. School Dist., 605 F.2d 186, 187 (5th Cir. 1979); Marcoux v.
Maine, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) t 35,259, at 37,798, 37,805-07 (D. Me. 1984); Marshall v. J.C.
Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
169. Wages have been broadly defined to "include all payments made to or on behalf of the
employee as remuneration for employment." 29 C.F.R. § 800.110 (1985). For discussions of the
cases and agency statements interpreting the term "wages," see I A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra
note 163, § 35.00; Sullivan, supra note 167, at 552-53. Although there is no question that such items
as vacation pay and holiday pay are wages under the EPA, it remains unclear whether fringe benefits
constitute wages. See infra note 172.
170. To be actionable under the EPA, sex-based wage discrimination must occur within a single
establishment. The Secretary of Labor has taken the position that "establishment" means a "distinct
physical place of business" rather than "an entire business or enterprise" which might include sev-
eral stores, plants, or facilities. 29 C.F.R. § 800.108 (1985). For discussions of the establishment
limitation, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 162, at 438; Sullivan, supra note 167, at 548-
52.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
172. The United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to rule on whether retirement
benefits or contributions to retirement plans are wages under the EPA. Los Angeles Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 712 n.23 (1978). The Department of Labor has also expressly
reserved judgment on whether the EPA covers fringe benefits that employers pay in recognition of
services performed, including contributions to pension and profit sharing plans and life, health, and
accident insurance. 29 C.F.R. § 800.113 (1985). A proposal was made during the Carter adminis-
tration to define wages to include fringe benefits, The Equal Pay Act-Fringe Benefits, 46 Fed. Reg.
43,851 (proposed Sept. 1, 1981), but it was not adopted. See infra note 175. One court has held,
however, that fringe benefits in the form of an employer-financed retirement fund constitute wages.
Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1306, 1311 (C.D. Cal.
1981).
Employer-furnished fringe benefits are clearly "compensation" under Title VII. Manhart, 435
U.S. at 712 n.23. Thus, a female part-time worker receiving unequal fringe benefits may sue under
Title VII for discrimination in compensation. The legal hurdles such a Title VII claimant might
then face are whether the employer's available defenses are broader under Title VII than under the
EPA and the proper allocation of the burden of proof. If, however, the plaintiff proves that she is
performing work equal to that of a male employee who receives greater fringe benefits, see supra note
167, her case should proceed as if it were brought under the EPA. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
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Although many part-time workers could successfully state prima facie cases
of discrimination under the EPA, their claims are more likely to falter on the
issue of whether the employer established an affirmative defense. Once a plain-
tiff in an EPA case proves that she is being paid for equal work at a rate lower
than her male counterpart, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
justify the disparity.17 3 The EPA provides three specific defenses and one gen-
eral defense to its basic equal pay command. Unequal pay is authorized if the
disparity is the result of payments made pursuant to (1) a seniority system, (2) a
merit system, or (3) a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of pro-
duction, or if the disparity is (4) based on any factor other than sex.17 4 In the
case of a female part-time worker who claims that she is paid at a lower hourly
rate than a full-time male worker, the employer will most likely resort to the
fourth affirmative defense to justify the disparity. The essence of the employer's
case is that any pay disparity between part-time and full-time workers is author-
ized under the EPA because part-time status constitutes a "factor other than
sex."
2. Agency Interpretations of the Fourth Affirmative Defense
The interpretations of the EPA originally issued by the Wage and Hour
Administrator of the Department of Labor 175 provide that a worker's part-time
status sometimes may justify unequal pay. In a special subsection addressing
recognized defenses or exceptions to the equal pay standard, part-time workers
are accorded only partial protection. The interpretation establishes a rule of
Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982) (equal pay case involving wages, discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 214-22); Marcoux v. Maine, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,259, at 37,805 (D.
Me. 1984); Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769, 781 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see
Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. 1983) (following Title VII disparate treat-
ment precedents).
173. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974); 29 C.F.R. § 800.141
(1985).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). For a discussion of the seniority, merit, and incentive system
exceptions, see Sullivan, supra note 167, at 587-92.
175. The status of the existing interpretations is in limbo. On July 1, 1979, enforcement respon-
sibility and authority for the EPA was transferred from the Department of Labor to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg.
19,807 (1978). At that time, the EEOC stated that it declined to adopt the substantive interpreta-
tions of the EPA promulgated by the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Administrator, but
would allow employers to continue to rely on them "to the extent they are not inconsistent with
statutory revisions and judicial interpretations." The Equal Pay Act; Interpretations and Opinions,
44 Fed. Reg. 38,671 (1979). Recently, the chairman of the EEOC recognized the problems created
by the agency's failure to adopt the existing regulations or to issue new ones. He described the
existing regulations as "almost useless to employers and employees because it is impossible for them
to know which regulations the EEOC deems effective and which it considers to have been over-
ruled." OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET REPORT, REGULATORY PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1985-MAR. 31, 1986, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 154,
at D-10 to D-13 (Aug. 9, 1985). The EEOC is currently considering whether to issue new interpre-
tations, to issue a new statement of its enforcement policy, or simply to disavow the existing regula-
tions without issuing anything in their place. Id. Thus, there is currently no reliable agency
statement on the part-time work issue under the EPA. New interpretative regulations were pro-
posed during the Carter administration, The Equal Pay Act; Interpretations, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,848
(proposed Sept. 1, 1981), but never adopted.
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thumb that presumptively exempts those employees who work twenty or fewer
hours a week from the protection of the EPA:
[T]he payment of a different wage to employees who work only a few
hours a day than to employees of the opposite sex who work a full day
will not necessarily involve noncompliance with the equal pay provi-
sions, even though both groups of workers are performing equal work
in the same establishment. No violation of the equal pay standards
would result if, for example, the difference in working time is the basis
for the pay differential, and the pay practice is applied uniformly to
both men and women. However, if employees of one sex work 30 to 35
hours a week and employees of the other sex work 40 to 45 hours, a
question would be raised as to whether the differential is not in fact
based on sex since different rates for part-time work are usually for
workweeks of 20 hours or less. 176
This interpretation attempts to help employers determine whether lower
rates of pay for part-time workers represent lawful disparities based only on "the
difference in working time" or unlawful discrimination based on the sex of the
workers. 177 The interpretation clearly outlaws paying female part-time workers
a lower hourly wage than male part-time workers doing identical work. 178 The
interpretation apparently also questions lower pay scales for part-time workers
in some situations in which male and female part-time workers are paid at the
same rate179 or in which the part-time work force is exclusively female. 180
176. 29 C.F.R. § 800.150 (1985). This interpretation covers temporary workers as well as part-
time workers. The interpretation provides that the payment of a lower wage rate to temporary
workers doing equal work may not be a violation of the EPA if "such a differential conforms with
the nature and duration of the job and with the customary practice in the industry and the establish-
ment, and the pay practice is applied uniformly to both men and women." Id. The interpretation
uses one month of employment as a rule of thumb to determine "whether the employment is in fact
temporary." Id.
The Carter Administration proposal would have deleted the interpretation governing part-time
and temporary workers. See supra note 175. Under the proposal, unequal pay would be authorized
only if the practice were "completely non-discriminatory and lacking any element of sex discrimina-
tion either expressly or impliedly" and had no "adverse impact" on either gender that was not
"related to job performance." Equal Pay Act-Permissible Bases for Pay Differentials, 46 Fed. Reg.
43,852, 43,852 (proposed Sept. 1, 1981).
177. To be acceptable under the EPA, pay differentials may not be based even in part on the sex
of workers. 29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1985).
178. Disparate rates of pay may not be set for male and female part-time workers, even if one
group costs more to employ. Under the interpretations, an employer may not justify a wage differen-
tial based on the claimed higher cost of employing female, rather than male, employees. Id.
§ 800.151.
179. An opinion letter issued by the Wage and Hour Administrator in 1975 indicated that an
employer may violate the EPA even if some male part-time workers are paid the lower part-time
rate. The Administrator found a possible EPA violation in a case in which 65% of the members of a
full-time crew were male, worked 40 or more hours per week, and were paid $.60 more per hour
than the part-time workers. The part-time workers were 82% female and typically worked 35 hours
per week. In the Administrator's opinion, neither the longer hours worked by the full-time employ-
ees nor their greater willingness to work overtime justified the pay disparity that fell most heavily
(although not exclusively) on women workers. Moreover, the mere fact that both working groups
were integrated did not insulate the employer from EPA liability. Opinion WH-359 (Aug. 7, 1975)(signed by Acting Wage-Hour Administrator Warren D. Landis). But see Opinion WH-347 (July
11, 1975) (signed by Acting Wage-Hour Administrator Warren D. Landis) (finding no EPA viola-
tion when both part-time and full-time working groups were integrated and part-time workers
earned more per hour than full-time workers).
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As an example of a questionable practice under the EPA, the interpretation
hypothesizes a situation in which part-time employees of one sex are paid less
than full-time employees of the other sex, even though part-time and full-time
employees work substantially the same number of hours. This scenario is a good
illustration of a case in which the employer uses the part-time designation as a
pretext for intentional sex-based discrimination. If female "part-time" employ-
ees work almost as many hours a week as male "full-time" employees, a pre-
sumption may arise that sex, rather than hours of work, is the true reason for a
pay differential. In less clearcut cases, the interpretation looks to common in-
dustry practice to determine whether pay differentials are suspicious. Because
employers most often pay lower wages only to employees who work twenty
hours per week or less, the interpretation uses the twenty-hour cutoff as a rule of
thumb to distinguish lawful pay disparities from unlawful sex discrimination.
The interpretation does not explicitly state or otherwise indicate that em-
ployers who pay part-time workers less than full-time workers are insulated
against liability only if the part-time employees work twenty hours a week or
less. 18 1 Rather, the interpretation suggests that pay disparities between part-
time and full-time workers are generally tolerated, unless a suspicion of discrimi-
nation is created because of the sexual composition of the two groups of employ-
ees and the lack of a substantial difference in the number of hours worked by
each group. Thus, if the two work forces are significantly integrated or if two
segregated groups work a substantially different number of hours per week, the
interpretation implies that a pay disparity is not unlawful.
As a practical matter, the partial part-time work exception to the equal pay
standard is the most significant exception delineated in the interpretations.1 8 2
The other presumptively valid exceptions specifically mentioned 8 3 affect far
fewer workers.
The interpretive exception for part-time workers under the EPA does not
explain why part-time status alone should ever justify a pay disparity. Nor do
the examples of other business practices authorized by the fourth affirmative
180. At least one court has ruled in favor of an exclusively female class of part-time workers. In
EEOC v. School Bd., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,330, at 23,315 (W.D. Pa. 1980), plaintiffs
were "light duty" custodians who worked 30 hours per week and complained of the higher wage
paid to male "heavy duty" custodians who worked 40 hours per week. Id. at 23,316. The fact that
there were no male part-time workers receiving the higher rate did not bar recovery. But see Jacobs
v. College of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1980) (EPA claim of part-time
female basketball coach failed in part because all the male coaches taught full-time, year round),
aff'd, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981).
181. Two other federal statutes use a 20 hour cutoff to determine part-time status. See 29
U.S.C.A. § 214(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1985) (authorizing subminimum wage employment for part-
time student workers); 42 U.S.C. § 3056(f) (1982) (authorizing the creation of part-time jobs for low
income, older Americans). These statutes do not explain why the 20 hour cutoff was chosen.
182. The parallel exception for temporary workers is also a significant exception. See supra note
176.
183. The interpretations authorize certain night shift differentials, 29 C.F.R. § 800.145 (1985),
"red circle" rates (certain unusual, higher than normal rates maintained for numerous reasons), id.
§ 800.146, disparate salaries for workers temporarily assigned to different jobs, id. § 800.147, and
disparate wages for workers in bona fide training programs, id. § 800.148. For a discussion of the
various exceptions, see Sullivan, supra note 167, at 592-606.
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defense suggest a single, coherent standard by which employers can distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate factors in setting pay rates.1 84 The interpre-
tations make clear that an employer may not base a wage differential expressly
on the sex of an employee or group of employees.' 85 But not all facially neutral
pay practices are authorized.18 6 The only common thread running through the
disparate facially neutral practices approved by the interpretations is that they
are all somewhat commonplace and thus do not represent extreme departures
from normal business practice.
3. Supreme Court Cases Interpreting the Fourth Affirmative Defense
The United States Supreme Court's statements on the nature and scope of
the EPA's fourth affirmative defense are sketchy and have not settled the signifi-
cant issue whether only intentionally discriminatory practices are unlawful. The
Court's first major decision, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,187 remains the
most important case construing the EPA. Corning Glass did not, however, pur-
port to delineate the precise scope of the fourth affirmative defense. The Court
ruled only that an employer's ability to articulate a facially neutral factor as the
reason for a pay disparity will not always insulate it from liability.
The Court in Corning Glass found an equal pay violation in the payment of
a base wage rate to male night shift inspectors that was higher than the rate paid
to female inspectors on the day shift. Coming unsuccessfully argued that the
male inspectors were paid the higher rate because they worked at night, not
because of their sex.1 88 The Court began its analysis by placing the burden of
justifying the pay differential on Coming.' 89 Coming was unable to meet its
burden for two principal reasons. First, because Coming paid the night shift a
shift differential above and beyond the higher base rate, the time of day worked
184. The authorized practices, supra note 183, often serve dissimilar functions. For example, a
night shift differential may reward employees for working under less desirable conditions than day-
time employees. Similarly, incentive payments, performance raises, and higher wages for trainees
may reward superior performance or induce such performance in the future. "Red circle" rates and
longevity raises, like seniority systems, tend to protect employees' expectations regardless of per-
formance. Temporary reassignment differentials tend to ensure that higher-paid workers will be
available when needed. See Campbell v. Von Hoffman Press, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. Mo.),
aff'd, 632 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1980).
185. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1985).
186. The "head of household" premium is a facially neutral practice that has been recognized as
likely to violate the EPA. See id. § 800.149. The premium is purportedly given because of the
worker's status as head of a family. The interpretations' drafters object to the premium because it
operates as a subterfuge for intentional discrimination, tends to be paid only to male employees, and
bears no relationship to job performance. Id. The courts are divided on the legitimacy of the head
of household premium. See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1983)
(head of household provision for spousal medical insurance upheld under Title VII), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 3544 (1984). But see EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (head of household bonus unlawful when given only to men), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th
Cir. 1986); Marshall v. A & M Consol. School Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 134, 137 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (head of household bonus unlawful when given only to men), aff'd, 605 F.2d 186 (5th
Cir. 1979).
187. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
188. Id. at 197.
189. Id. at 196.
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could not by itself fully explain the base rate differential. 190 Second, the Court
found that the separate base wage rates had their geneses in sex discrimination.
As a historical matter, the higher rate for males had been established to reflect
the generally higher wage level for men and to compensate male workers for
performing "demeaning" women's work.1 9 1 This history undercut Coming's
contention that the base rate differential was a nondiscriminatory response to
the greater psychological and physical demands of night work.192
Corning Glass is often cited for its rejection of the so-called market de-
fense. 193 The Court made clear that employers may not avoid liability under the
EPA merely by relying on market factors and disclaiming any hostility to wo-
men.1 94 The Court did not permit Coming to take advantage of women's lack
of bargaining strength in the market and to justify the resulting pay disparity by
claiming that women could have avoided the lower wage by securing higher-
paid men's work. 195 Citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 19 6 for analogous sup-
port,1 9 7 the Court concluded that the disparity in pay between male and female
workers in Corning Glass was discriminatory because "though phrased in terms
of a neutral factor other than sex, [it] nevertheless operated to perpetuate the
effects of the company's prior illegal practice of paying women less than men for
equal work." 198
This mode of analysis in Justice Marshall's opinion in Corning Glass sug-
gests that the factor-other-than-sex defense is a relatively narrow one that
should not seriously undermine the basic objective of the EPA. Under Corning
Glass, it is clear that if an employer formerly expressly discriminated on the
basis of sex, it may not escape liability unless it changes its practices to remedy
the prior explicit discrimination. By disapproving of facially neutral practices
that perpetuate prior discrimination, the Court seemed to follow the course pre-
viously set in Title VII cases. Title VII has been interpreted to outlaw not only
intentional sex-based discrimination but also facially neutral practices that have
an unjustified adverse impact on women. 199 Similar to the Title VII cases, Corn-
190. Id. at 192.
191. Id. at 204-05.
192. Id. at 204.
193. See, e.g., Beall v. Curtis, 603 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 778 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.
1985); EEOC v. Village of Schaumburg, No. 82 C 1825, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Marshall v. Georgia Southwestern College, 489 F. Supp. 1322,
1330-31 (M.D. Ga. 1980); see also authorities cited in B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 162, at
462 (discussing market defense).
194. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 205.
195. Id. at 207-08.
196. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
197. For a discussion of Griggs and its progeny, see Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality
Under Title VII. Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 305, 343-44 (1983).
198. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 209-10.
199. The United States Supreme Court has described disparate or adverse impact claims as in-
volving "employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). For exam-
ples of cases granting recovery under a disparate impact theory, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing Glass implies that employers not only must refrain from intentional sex-
based discrimination but also must remove any unjustified barriers to equal pay,
even if such barriers were not designed to discriminate. Under this reading, the
principal difference between the two statutory schemes would be the EPA's ap-
proval of bona fide job evaluation plans, perhaps even if such plans disadvan-
taged women wage earners.2°°
There is also language in Corning Glass, however, to suggest that the intent
of an employer is pivotal in determining the legality of a facially neutral pay
practice. The Court examined the history of Coming's base wage rate differen-
tial to determine whether the higher rate was "in fact intended" to serve as
compensation for the less desirable night work.20 1 The history of the pay prac-
tice, coupled with the fact that the male employees also received a night shift
differential denominated as such, makes it tenable to characterize Corning Glass
as a case in which the employer merely failed to carry its burden of proving its
lack of invidious intent.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not appreciably refined the Corn-
ing Glass analysis and have left open the choice between a subjective standard of
EPA liability centering on the employer's present purpose in adopting or main-
taining a pay differential and a more objective standard that focuses on whether
the pay disparity is justified in the particular context. Dicta in two later
cases,202 however, suggest that the Court may now be amenable to a more em-
ployer-oriented stance than the Corning Glass analysis.
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,2 0 3 the
Supreme Court held that an employer could not require female employees to
contribute more to a pension fund than male employees contributed. The Court
rejected the City's contention that the different contributions were based on the
neutral factor of longevity rather than on sex. In a footnote, the Court charac-
terized the City's claim as "specious" and reasoned that a gender-neutral
scheme, rather than a gender-based scheme, would more accurately key benefits
to longevity. Because the challenged plan was explicitly based on sex, the EPA's
fourth affirmative defense was unavailable. The Court suggested, however, that
gender neutrality might be enough to establish the defense if the neutrality were
genuine:
[A]n entirely gender-neutral system of contributions and benefits
would result in differing retirement benefits precisely "based on" lon-
gevity, for retirees with long lives would always receive more money
440 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975).
200. The Court in Corning Glass read the legislative history of the EPA to permit employer use
of factors incorporated in job evaluation plans. "Congress' intent, as manifested in this history, was
to use these terms to incorporate into the new federal Act the well-defined and well-accepted princi-
ples of job evaluation so as to ensure that wage differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation
plans would be outside the purview of the Act." Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 201.
201. Id. at 204.
202. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); City of Los Angeles Dep't or
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
203. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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than comparable employees with short lives. Such a plan would also
distinguish in a crude way between male and female pensioners, be-
cause of the difference in average life spans. It is this sort of dispar-
ity-and not an explicitly gender-based differential-that the Equal
Pay Act intended to authorize. 2° 4
The tantalizing suggestion that the EPA authorizes disparate impact if such
impact arises from a gender-neutral factor could be read to enlarge the fourth
affirmative defense to encompass all facially neutral pay practices that are not
intended to discriminate on the basis of sex. Such a reading, however, may take
too little account of the specific factual context of Manhart. The Court in Man-
hart indicated only that the employer's noninvidious use of a facially neutral
factor having a disparate impact on men as a group (that is, the use of longevity
to determine retirement plan contributions and benefits) does not violate the
EPA. It is not surprising that the Court would tolerate a neutral pay practice
having a disparate impact on the traditionally advantaged male group,205 when
the alternative practice expressly discriminated against individual women. The
Court did not address the more difficult question whether the EPA allows em-
ployers to base their salary structures on neutral factors that have a disparate
impact on women.
The latest Supreme Court discussion of the EPA's fourth affirmative de-
fense is similarly ambiguous. By a narrow majority, the Court ruled in County
of Washington v. Gunther20 6 that the equal work requirement of the EPA is not
an essential ingredient in a Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination.
Gunther construed the Bennett Amendment,20 7 the provision of Title VII that
attempts to harmonize the general prohibitions of Title VII with the more spe-
cific provisions of the EPA. The Court held that the Bennett Amendment does
not engraft the EPA's equal work requirement onto Title VII litigation, but
merely incorporates the four affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII.20 8
In response to the dissenters' charge that the Court's ruling rendered the Ben-
nett Amendment superfluous, the majority speculated that the Bennett Amend-
ment's incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense into Title VII litigation
could have "significant consequences for Title VII litigation. ' 20 9 The Court in-
dicated how the defense might narrow employer liability in comparison to ordi-
nary Title VII litigation:
Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory employment practices
204. Id. at 713 n.24.
205. For an argument that disparate impact theory may not be invoked by traditionally favored
groups, see Chamallas, supra note 197, at 366-68.
206. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
207. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
Id. § 2000e-2(h).
208. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171.
209. Id. at 170.
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was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing "not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. . . The structure of Title
VII litigation, including presumptions, burdens of proof, and defenses,
has been designed to reflect this approach. The fourth affirmative de-
fense of the Equal Pay Act, however, was designed differently, to con-
fine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex
discrimination. Equal Pay Act litigation, therefore, has been struc-
tured to permit employers to defend against charges of discrimination
where their pay differentials are based on a bona fide use of "other
factors other than sex." Under the Equal Pay Act, the courts and ad-
ministrative agencies are not permitted "to substitute their judgment
for the judgment of the employer . . . who [has] established and ap-
plied a bona fide job rating system," so long as it does not discriminate
on the basis of sex. 210
The Gunther dicta may be read to discredit the use of disparate impact
analysis in EPA litigation. Unlike Corning Glass, which cited Griggs as analo-
gous support for its interpretation of the EPA's fourth affirmative defense, the
Court in Gunther contrasted the Griggs disparate impact analysis to the ap-
proach triggered by the fourth affirmative defense. The Gunther dicta, like the
Manhart footnote discussed above, seem to suggest that the EPA's fourth affirm-
ative defense protects a wide range of facially neutral practices. However, the
Gunther dicta specifically approve only bona fide job rating systems, without
commenting on the legitimacy of other facially neutral factors that might have a
disparate impact on women.
Taken together, the Supreme Court opinions construing the EPA make
only three firm points. First, the burden of establishing the fourth affirmative
defense is on the employer. Second, the factor on which the employer relies to
justify a pay disparity must at least be facially neutral. Last, pay differentials
based on a bona fide job rating plan are protected. Beyond these three points,
the Supreme Court opinions leave open the scope of the fourth affirmative de-
fense. Most significantly, the opinions do not instruct lower courts how to judge
the legitimacy of employer reliance on facially neutral factors that are not part
of a job rating system and that tend to disadvantage women.
4. Lower Court Cases Interpreting the Fourth Affirmative Defense
For the most part, the decisions 'of lower courts have honored the three
points made by the Supreme Court.21' The recent trend, however, is to broaden
the scope of the EPA's fourth affirmative defense.2 12 Nonetheless, because the
210. Id. at 170-71 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); 109 CONG.
REC. 9209 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell)).
211. There has been some reluctance, however, to place the burden of persuasion on the em-
ployer. See Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1983) (treating burden of
persuasion as if it were only a burden of production); Derouin v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 37 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,398, at 38,580 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (treating burden of persuasion as if it were
only a burden of production).
212. See infra notes 214-32 and accompanying text.
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decisions are far from uniform, it would be premature to pronounce that specific
intent to discriminate has become the sole standard of liability under the
EPA.
2 13
The most complete discussion of the scope of the fourth affirmative defense
is set forth in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.214 Kouba tested the legality of the
employer's practice of basing the salaries of new sales agents on the agents' prior
salaries. The class of female agents in Kouba traced its lower average pay to
Allstate's use of the prior salary factor.2 15 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California found an EPA violation, reasoning that use of
the prior salary factor tended to perpetuate past discrimination against women.
Because of its potential discriminatory effect, the district court held that the
employer's use of prior salaries in setting rates of pay could not be regarded
under the EPA's fourth affirmative defense as a "factor other than sex," unless
the employer presented proof that each individual female agent's salary was not
tainted by sex discrimination. 2 16
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and imposed a less stringent
prohibition against the use of the prior salary factor.2 17 The court held that the
EPA's fourth affirmative defense is available whenever the employer proves that
an acceptable business purpose underlies a challenged wage differential and that
the employer's use of the factor was reasonable in light of its stated purpose and
other practices.218 The court thus was willing to permit Allstate to present
proof that its reliance on prior salaries operated either as a sales incentive or as a
predictor of the performance of new employees. 2 19
The "reasonableness" standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Kouba
could readily operate in favor of employers. 220 It is easy to convert this stan-
dard into a search for intentionality; in fact, the Kouba court's underlying con-
213. When the burden of persuasion is placed on the employer, it may be difficult to tell whether
a ruling for the plaintiff reflects merely the employer's failure to prove lack of intentional discrimina-
tion or the court's independent assessment of the unjustified operation of a truly neutral factor.
214. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). Strictly speaking, Kouba was a Title VII, rather than an EPA
case. Although the EPA's equal work requirement was satisfied, plaintiff in Kouba brought only a
Title VII claim. Her apparent reasons for doing so were uncertainty as to how the EPA affected
Title VII and the less demanding class-consent requirements under Title VII. Id. at 875 n.3. The
court, however, declined to follow Title VII disparate treatment analysis and refused to allocate the
burden of persuasion to the plaintiff. It gave no indication that it would follow a different approach
in a true EPA case. Id. at 875.
The claimants ultimately prevailed in Kouba. Allstate agreed to a five million dollar settlement,
purported to be the largest back pay award ever made in an equal pay case. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 192, at A-3 (Oct. 3, 1984).
215. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 875 n.5.
216. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 162 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 873 (9th
Cir. 1982).
217. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 878.
218. Id. at 876-77.
219. Id. at 877-78.
220. The court, however, characterized its "reasonableness standard" as a middle ground posi-
tion between the "extremes" suggested by the litigants. Id. at 876. The court rejected Allstate's
claim that the fourth affirmative defense prohibited only the explicit use of gender or the use of a
neutral factor resulting in lower pay for all female employees. Id. On the other hand, the court also
rejected both the district court's "perpetuation" approach and plaintiffs' contention that the fourth
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cern appears to have been with preventing employer "manipulation" of the prior
salary factor.22 1 The court did not, however, entirely foreclose an objective ap-
proach to assessing reasonableness, which would not focus exclusively on the
subjective intent of the employer. In two footnotes,22 2 the court noted that some
business reasons for salary disparities that make "economic sense" may never-
theless be unacceptable, and it reserved judgment on whether "market demand"
can ever be used to justify unequal pay. These reservations suggest that the
court has not yet wholeheartedly embraced an intent standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also pro-
tected employer interests223 by resurrecting a modified market defense, despite
the Supreme Court's warning in Corning Glass that employers should not take
advantage of a market that is inhospitable to women. The court in Homer v.
Mary Institute224 held that an employer may meet the salary demands of a new
male employee, even if an incumbent female is currently doing the same job for
lower pay. The hair-splitting distinction between Horner and Corning Glass is
that the male employee in Homer affirmatively held out for more money, but the
female employees in Corning Glass were passively willing to work for lower
wages than their male counterparts. Given that such a distinction is hardly
compelling, 225 it may be appropriate to regard Homer as a case that requires
evidence of invidious employer intent to discriminate before finding an EPA
violation.
Despite these appellate opinions tending toward a broad construction of the
fourth affirmative defense, there is still much uncertainty concerning the scope
of the defense. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recently rejected an employer's attempt to infuse disparate treatment
analysis into EPA litigation.226 Two other appellate courts have stated in dicta
that proof of intent to discriminate under the EPA is unnecessary, describing the
EPA's approach as a strict liability theory of discrimination. 227 Moreover, the
fourth affirmative defense appears to have a narrower scope in cases in which
affirmative defense protected only reliance on factors that "measure the value of an employee's job
performance to his or her employer." Id. at 877.
221. See id. at 878.
222. Id. at 876-77 nn.6-7.
223. Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980). The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit also apparently construes the EPA's fourth affirmative defense to require a
showing of invidious intent. See Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983). The
court in Plemer used a Title VII disparate treatment framework in analyzing an EPA claim and
remanded the case to give plaintiff the opportunity to prove that the employer's proffered reasons for
the challenged pay disparity were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 1137; see also Derouin v.
Litton Indus. Prods., 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,398, at 38,580 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (using dispa-
rate treatment framework in EPA case).
224. 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980).
225. See EEOC v. Village of Schaumburg, No. 82 C 1825, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (rejecting Homer's endorsement of the market
defense).
226. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (employer that
intentionally segregates jobs by sex may not defend by proving a good faith belief that jobs were
unequal).
227. Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1261 (7th Cir. 1985); Strecker v.
Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 99 n.1 (8th Cir. 1980); accord Lanegan-Grimm
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plaintiffs secure judgments. For example, in Schulte v. Wilson Industries228 the
court interpreted Gunther as limiting application of the fourth affirmative de-
fense to bona fide job rating systems229 and relied on Title VII disparate impact
precedents to hold that an employer could not use an employee's college degree
as a factor in setting the employee's salary. Reliance on the college degree did
not meet the test of job-relatedness. 2 30 Another district court has cited Corning
Glass for the proposition that the fourth affirmative defense does not shield
"seemingly neutral factors which would operate to perpetuate past discrimina-
tion. '23 1 Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
explicitly refused to embrace either a broad or a narrow construction of the
fourth affirmative defense, preferring to await a more appropriate case to express
an opinion.232
B. Reforming the Equal Pay Act for Part-Time Workers
Whether part-time workers can successfully claim equal pay for equal work
under the EPA hinges on what standard the courts ultimately adopt to delimit
the scope of the fourth affirmative defense. The choice is between a subjective
standard that focuses exclusively on an employer's state of mind or a more ob-
jective standard that looks to other factors to determine whether a pay disparity
is justified.
A subjective intent standard will likely maintain the status quo. Under a
subjective standard, the twenty hours per week rule of thumb23 3 may continue
to function as a rough guide to liability. Probative circumstantial evidence in
determining subjective intent is whether the employer follows a common prac-
tice in paying its part-time work force at a lower rate. The twenty hour cutoff,
which is purportedly based on normal industry practice, alerts employers that
unusual pay practices may be vulnerable to charges of discrimination. But the
twenty hour standard presumably also authorizes lower pay for "true" part-time
workers. Under this approach, many employers can continue to pay part-time
workers less for equal work, provided that they do not segregate their work
forces to such an extent that the lower part-time wage may be seen only as a
v. Library Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486, 491 (D. Or. 1983); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F.
Supp. 1300, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
228. 547 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
229. Id. at 339 n.16.
230. Id. at 341.
231. Marshall v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1195 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
232. Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1031 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984). Early EPA opinions involving the question whether employee training programs con-
stituted a factor other than sex adopted a narrow construction of the fourth affirmative defense. See,
e.g., Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir.) (male-dominated training pro-
gram not a defense under the EPA because program lacked a determinable termination point), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Schultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969)
(exclusively male training program not a defense because program was informal and unwritten, and
advancement was unpredictable). See generally Sullivan, supra note 167, at 592-95 (discussing train-
ing program exception).
233. See supra text accompanying note 176.
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pretext for sex discrimination.2 34
If the courts reject a subjective standard as the test governing the scope of
the fourth affirmative defense in EPA cases, part-time workers will be able to
marshal compelling arguments in favor of equal pay. The degree of protection
that part-time workers may receive if the courts select an objective standard is
likely to depend on the ability of employers to prove that part-time workers are
less qualified or less effective than full-time workers. If the focus is on work-
related qualities of the part-time work force, the employer's burden of proof will
increase significantly, and part-time workers stand a good chance of winning
equal pay cases.
1. The Case Against a Subjective Standard
Arguments against the adoption of an intent-based standard of liability are
distressingly familiar to the civil rights lawyer because they have been made so
often, frequently to no avail in the politically conservative legal climate of the
last decade.2 35 However, legal and policy arguments against using motivational
analysis in the EPA context are particularly strong. With respect to the part-
time work issue, the relevant question is likely to be whether the courts believe
that employers should have the right to exact special penalties for an employee's
decision to work part-time.
The case against an intent-based standard begins with an appreciation for
the policy behind the EPA. In passing the Act, Congress recognized that it was
addressing a specific problem that was based on the fact that the "wage structure
of all too many segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but
outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more
than a woman even though his duties are the same."'236 Congress expected that
this legislation would have a significant effect on employer pay practices and
would change the market price for women's labor. Expected disruptions in the
business world and labor market were tolerated because the basic principle that
there should be equal pay for equal work was not seriously contested.2 37
234. The one measure of protection that part-time workers might continue to enjoy if subjective
intent were adopted as the governing standard is the placing of the burden of persuasion on the
employer. As long as employers must prove that sex bias played no part in their decision to pay
part-time workers less for equal work, the part-time claimant stands a chance to win. However, if a
subjective standard is chosen, courts might be inclined to reallocate the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiff. See supra notes 211, 223. For a discussion of the allocation of burdens of proof in Title VII
disparate treatment cases, see Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme
Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUs. REL. L.J. 353
(1984).
235. For cases requiring proof of discriminatory intent, see General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 485 U.S. 375 (1982) (claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982)); Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (claim of voting dilution); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(claim of race discrimination in hiring); Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (suit for school
desegregation); cf. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (discriminatory
intent required only for award of compensatory damages under Title VI).
236. S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963); see Note, Not Just Any "Factor Other Than
Sex"." An Analysis of the Fourth Affirmative Defense of the Equal Pay Act, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
318, 321-27 (1984).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 687 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 687; S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1963).
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Compared to the more controversial concept of comparable worth, the
EPA mandate of equal pay for equal work is relatively well-defined and com-
mands a consensus that other tenets of antidiscrimination law do not enjoy. As
the Supreme Court in Corning Glass recognized, when Congress narrowed the
scope of the EPA to encompass only jobs that were recognized by industry ex-
perts to be equal, 238 the room for employer justification of pay disparities de-
creased correspondingly. The narrow definition of equal work in the EPA
means that, as a practical matter, an EPA plaintiff's prima facie burden to prove
equal work is particularly difficult compared to evidentiary burdens imposed by
other civil rights statutes. 239 It is not enough for the female EPA plaintiff to
present evidence that her employer is generally hostile or unsympathetic to the
interests of women. Absent proof of unequal pay for equal work-most often
supplied by job evaluation experts-a plaintiff cannot state a claim under the
EPA. At least in those instances in which a plaintiff proves that her employer's
policies result in a pattern of lower wages for women, 24° the defendant should be
required to shoulder a comparably heavy burden. In such cases, it is fair to
require the employer to pinpoint a specific business reason that serves to justify,
not merely to excuse, the pay disparity.
Rejection of an exclusively intent-based standard of liability under the EPA
is also compatible with the Supreme Court precedent, particularly Justice Mar-
shall's liberal opinion in Corning Glass. The Court in Corning Glass read a con-
fusing legislative history24 1 to warrant shifting the burden of persuasion to the
employer once an EPA plaintiff has proved equal work.242 The Court's decision
to assign the burden to the employer and to treat the factor-other-than-sex ex-
238. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 198-202.
239. For example, to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in hiring under Title
VII, a female plaintiff need show only that (1) she belongs to a protected minority; (2) she applied for
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite her qualifica-
tions, she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applications from persons with plaintiff's qualifications. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (black worker asserting racial discrimination). Many
courts have adapted the McDonnell Douglas test in framing the elements of a plaintiff's prima facie
case of disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 162, at 498-99 (discussing prima facie
case under ADEA).
240. If the EPA claimant can identify only one male worker who is doing equal work and receiv-
ing a higher wage, and the average wage for female workers in the job category is no lower than the
average male wage, the case against a subjective standard of liability is far less compelling. Cf.
Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1984) (no EPA violation when male professor was
paid less than one of his female colleagues who received a salary increase commensurate with an
outside offer). Winkes is discussed in Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51
U. CHi. L. REV. 1078, 1103-06 (1984), and Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legis-
lation: A Reply to Freed and Polsby, 51 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1112, 1121-28 (1984). Such cases are rare,
however. In the more typical case in which plaintiff proves that the challenged practice has an
adverse impact on women as a group, the more stringent objective standard of liability is warranted.
See supra note 168.
241. For a discussion of conflicting statements in the EPA legislative history concerning the
issue of the burden of proof, see 29 C.F.R. § 800.141(b) (1985). Even before Corning Glass, the
Department of Labor took the position that the burden of persuasion should be placed on the em-
ployer, primarily because this was the practice under other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Id.
242. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196-97.
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ception as a true affirmative defense, rather than as a mere rebuttal, accords best
with a non-intent-based notion of discrimination.
Under an intent-based theory, when liability centers on the sole issue of
employer motivation, it is sensible to regard the employer's case as requiring a
simple denial of the plaintiff's factual allegations. The employer is not called
upon to justify its practice but must only present evidence indicating that the
practice was not intentionally devised as a mechanism to discriminate against
women. In such an intent-based system, the burden of persuasion on the critical
issue of intent is most often assigned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion because the plaintiff is the party seeking a change in the
status quo and because the plaintiff is charging the defendant with what most
persons regard as morally repugnant behavior. Thus, in Title VII disparate
treatment cases in which intent is the touchstone of liability, the Supreme Court
has explicitly placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff.243
When the critical issue is not the factual existence of intent vel non but the
more complex question whether a truly neutral practice should be regarded as
acceptable or justified, the burden of persuasion should shift to the defendant.
For example, in Title VII disparate impact cases, in which employer liability is
premised on a finding of unjustified adverse impact, most courts assign the de-
fendant the burden of persuasion. 244 This assignment makes sense because the
defendant is almost invariably the only party in possession of information most
relevant to the justification issue. The employer presumably has considered al-
ternative practices and is fully aware of the decision-making process that led it
to adopt the challenged practice.245 Thus, if Corning Glass follows the Title VII
pattern, the Court's assignment of the burden of persuasion to the defendant
suggests that the substantive standard governing liability should be objective, as
it is in Title VII disparate impact cases.
Aside from implications stemming from assigning the burden of persuasion
to the employer, the Court's disapproval of a market defense in Corning Glass
bolsters the argument that an employer's good faith should not insulate it from
EPA liability. As the growing body of comparable worth cases indicates,246
employers frequently characterize their pay decisions as neutral responses to the
market. Insofar as Corning Glass refuses to treat reliance on the market as nec-
essarily nondiscriminatory, the case suggests that the EPA requires more than
good faith treatment of women workers. Manhart also suggests that good faith
243. See, eg., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
244. See, e.g., Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1984); Johnson
v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Ellison v.
Best Foods, 598 F. Supp. 159, 164 (E.D. Ark. 1984). But see Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975,
991 (3d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff retains burden of persuasion); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d
696, 702 (5th Cir. 1980) (employer has burden of production but not persuasion); Grove v. Frost-
burg Nat'l Bank, 549 F. Supp. 922, 938 n.1 I (D. Md. 1982) ("effect of Burdine on disparate impact
analysis is unclear").
245. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1355 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
246. See, eg., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 511 (1984); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977); Briggs v. City of Madison,
536 F. Supp. 435, 446 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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is not always a good defense.247 The Manhart Court's adamant refusal to allow
employers explicitly to distinguish between men and women workers with re-
spect to fringe benefits indicates that even the most widely accepted good faith
practices may violate the EPA.
24 8
2. Implications of Varying Objective Approaches
If intent is not the exclusive governing standard for EPA liability, there is
no good reason for adhering to the Department of Labor's twenty hour per week
cutoff.249 The twenty hour rule can be justified only as a rule of thumb for
detecting employers who may be using part-time status as a pretext for inten-
tional sex discrimination. As Professor Sullivan observed, the twenty hour rule
seems designed to ferret out discriminatory motive:
If a different rate is applied to "true" part-time employees (in the sense
that they work relatively few hours a week), the Bulletin views this as
"normal" enough not to trigger suspicion that the scheme is a device
concealing sex discrimination. On the other hand, the use of different
rates for persons whose working week approaches full-time stature is
sufficiently abnormal to raise doubts about the basis for the decision,
requiring the employer to provide at least some persuasive, non-gender
related reason for its compensation structure.2 50
The Department of Labor's interpretations do not indicate what objective
considerations, if any, may justify paying lower wages to "true" part-time work-
ers. Nor is it possible to detect a real difference between an employee who works
twenty hours a week and another who works thirty hours. Because the twenty
hour cutoff is not easily tied to any of the possible objective approaches to the
EPA's fourth affirmative defense, it is unlikely to be adopted by a court that
rejects intent as the standard of liability.
Aside from undermining the rationale for the twenty hour cutoff, the rejec-
tion of intent as the standard of EPA liability does not help to formulate an
objective standard to be used in its stead. Three objective standards have sur-
247. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
248. The procedural and remedial scheme of the EPA also accords with a non-intent-based stan-
dard of liability. The EPA claimant must fie within two years of the accrual of the cause of action,
unless the violation was willful. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982). Further, the successful EPA claimant is
entitled to liquidated damages, unless the employer proves "that the act or omission giving rise to
[the EPA] action was in good faith and that [the employer] had reasonable grounds for believing that
his act or omission was not a violation." Id. § 260; see Richards, Monetary Awards in Equal Pay Act
Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REv. 328 (1975). This two-tiered system suggests that there may be liability
without invidious intent but that such intent may lengthen the statute of limitations or trigger an
award of liquidated damages. This reasoning persuaded the court in EEOC v. Mifflin School Dist.,
39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1985), to hold that disparate impact analysis was
appropriate in Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) litigation. However, the court in
dicta contrasted the EPA statutory scheme to the ADEA and disapproved of the use of the disparate
impact standard in EPA litigation. Id. at 1065. The court concluded that the language of the
ADEA is more supportive of an objective approach than the language of the EPA because the
ADEA permits employment decisions based on "reasonable factors other than age," while the
EPA's fourth affirmative defense protects employers who rely on "any factor other than sex" in
making employment decisions. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying note 176.
250. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 604.
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faced in cases and commentary. Although they could differ appreciably in oper-
ation, each standard is capable of bringing part-time workers within the basic
protection of the EPA.
The "reasonableness" test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Kouba 25t is an
employer-oriented test that barely qualifies as an objective standard. Reminis-
cent of the minimum level of scrutiny in equal protection constitutional analy-
sis,252 the reasonableness standard easily could collapse into a search for intent.
As articulated by the court, however, the Kouba reasonableness test incorporates
two objective features: a requirement that courts decide as a threshold matter
that an employer's proffered justification for a pay disparity is "acceptable" and
a requirement that employers adduce preponderant proof that their compensa-
tion standards in fact further such acceptable ends.
The two alternative objective standards have much in common and are con-
siderably more employee-oriented than the Kouba reasonableness test. At least
two district courts253 and a student commentator 254 have suggested that the
EPA's fourth affirmative defense should encompass only factors that are objec-
tively job-related. Supporters of this view argue that Congress regarded only
those factors traditionally included in job evaluation schemes as embodying con-
cerns significant enough to justify deviation from the equal pay standard.25  In
a similar vein, Professor Sullivan has argued that liability standards applied in
Title VII cases should guide EPA analysis as well.2 56 Under this approach, any
pay policy that systematically disadvantages women would be justified only if it
were regarded as a business necessity.
In practice, the two alternative objective standards are likely to produce the
same results, although Professor Sullivan's approach functions more directly to
create a coherent conception of equality by harmonizing the two antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.2 57 Both alternative objective standards clearly require employers
to justify neutral compensation practices that have a disparate impact on wo-
men. Both standards also focus on actual job performance or on the qualities
possessed by employees that are predictive of successful job performance.
Probably the major difference between these two objective standards and
the Kouba reasonableness test is that the former incorporate the judgment that
251. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 214-22).
252. Courts faced with equal protection challenges to economic legislation most often employ a
"rational relation" test to determine the constitutionality of the legislation. Under this deferential
standard, economic legislation is upheld so long as it furthers a legitimate state objective. See, e.g.,
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955). Only very rarely is state action overturned under the rationality standard. See, e.g.,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982).
253. Schulte v. Wilson Indus., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324, 341 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 161-62 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
254. Note, supra note 236, at 322.
255. Id. at 323-25.
256. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 584-87; see also The Equal Pay Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,850, 43,852
(Sept. 1, 1981) (proposing a standard similar to Sullivan's approach).
257. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 585.
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workers' interest in equal opportunity should be subordinated only to employ-
ers' interest in securing a qualified work force, that is, merit considerations. 25 8
Under these two objective standards, adverse impact is justified only when a
challenged practice is necessary to reward employee merit or to attract employ-
ees of a high quality. The Kouba test, in contrast, presumably would allow any
legitimate business objective to override the interest in equal opportunity, even if
the objective were not specifically tied to merit considerations.
A part-time worker's chances for success in an equal pay claim under any
of these three objective standards is difficult to predict in the abstract. Such a
lawsuit would turn on two key considerations: the nature of the employer's rea-
son for the pay disparity and the degree to which the employer could demon-
strate that the disparity was in fact attributable to the proferred reason.
Although the Kouba test would shield more employers from liability than the
other two standards, part-time workers should be able to present viable claims
under all three approaches.
Employers are likely to focus on three types of justification to counter chal-
lenges to existing pay disparities between full-time and part-time workers. First,
employers are likely to argue that the market rate for part-time workers is lower
than that for full-time workers because part-time workers are willing to work for
lower pay. Second, some employers may gather data indicating that costs of
employing part-time workers are greater than those for full-time workers. For
example, the employer might claim that part-time workers quit their jobs more
frequently, cost more to supervise, or generate higher record keeping costs. Fi-
nally, employers may argue that part-time workers are less capable workers in
certain jobs that purportedly require the attention of one full-time worker. For
example, an employer might claim that even two supervisory level part-time
workers are less capable of overseeing a staff of full-time subordinates than is one
full-time supervisor.
An unadorned market rate defense premised solely on part-time workers'
willingness to work for lower pay is unlikely to protect employers under any of
the three objective tests. The defense certainly fails under the two more em-
ployee-oriented standards. The market rate is not so closely tied to actual or
potential job performance to qualify as job-related, and if the defense were sub-
258. A similar debate in Title VII disparate impact cases centers around the question whether an
employer must prove that a challenged practice is related to satisfactory job performance, or whether
the employer may rely on other interests to meet its burden of proving that the practice is a business
necessity. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552-53 (11th Cir. 1984)
(employer may take fetal safety into account in excluding fertile women from toxic workplace);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1188-91 (5th Cir. 1982) (employer may take fetal safety into
account in excluding fertile women from toxic workplace), on remand, 585 F. Supp. 1447
(W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984). But see Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633
F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (employer may not exclude pregnant female employee to
prevent risk to fetus), cert denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). When the interest the employer asserts is
not as weighty as fetal health and involves only employer inconvenience or expense, courts may
insist on proof of job-relatedness. See Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (firing competent employee because of multiple wage garnishments unlawful); cf. State
Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox, 65 N.Y.2d 213, 480 N.E.2d 695, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1985) (unlawful
under state antidiscrimination law to deny employment to otherwise qualified obese person based on
fear of adverse impact on life or disability insurance program).
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jected to a Title VII-type disparate impact challenge, it could not justify a pay
disparity between substantially equal jobs.259
Even under the less stringent Kouba reasonableness test, the market rate
defense would likely fail. Notably, the Kouba court expressly refused to rule on
the propriety of an unadorned market defense.260 If, however, the employer
were able to prove that it could not secure a sufficient number of competent full-
time workers without raising the full-time rate, the market defense might suc-
ceed. The hair-splitting distinction sometimes drawn between forbidding em-
ployers to take advantage of a market that undervalues the services of women
and allowing employers to keep pace with a market that places a greater value
on services performed predominately by male employees could have some signif-
icance in the part-time work context.26 1 This modified market defense should
not be available, however, unless the employer offers proof that it tried and
failed to fill full-time vacancies. Further, in keeping with the individualistic
spirit of the EPA, even a court applying the Kouba reasonableness standard
might refuse to accept a market defense in a situation in which salaries were not
individually negotiated. 262
The defense that part-time workers cost more to employ may protect em-
ployers from liability, but only if employers can document actual increased
costs. Unlike the market defense, the cost factor may be tied more directly to an
employer's actual experience with part-time workers and thus less readily linked
to sex alone.
The principal problem with the cost defense is that it focuses on the aggre-
gate part-time work force rather than on individual part-time workers. Thus,
the cost factor is a generalization that may not fit many part-time employees.
For example, the fact that an employer can document higher turnover rates and
greater training costs for part-time workers as a group may not justify lower pay
for a part-time worker who has greater seniority than the average full-time
worker. The Supreme Court has taken the position that a focus on the aggregate
work force is unlawful when the employer contends that women, as opposed to
men, cost more to employ.263 In the part-time context, of course, the question is
259. Cf. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846,
861-63 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (market rate reflects factors other than objective job worth), rev'd, 770
F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
260. Kouba, 691 F.2d at 877 n.7 (court chose not to rule on propriety of defense because em-
ployer-defendant offered no evidence supporting its use).
261. For cases allowing a modified market defense, see Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714
(8th Cir. 1980) (EPA claim; pay differential based on experience, ability, and training); Christensen
v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (Title VII claim; factors included supply of willing work-
ers and presence of organized labor); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 446-48 (W.D.
Wis. 1982) (Title VII claim; factors included perceived difficulties of recruitment and retention of
qualified workers); cf. Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1984) (EPA permits employer
to raise employee's salary to match outside offer).
262. See Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1984); Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d
706 (8th Cir. 1980). In both cases, a modified market defense was allowed in circumstances in which
salaries were individually negotiated.
263. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
The Court inManhart cited 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1985) (see supra note 178) with approval, 435 U.S.
at 714 n.26, and noted that an amendment to the EPA that would have authorized a wage differen-
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more complex. The adversely affected group is not exclusively female and a
facially neutral factor is used as the grouping principle. The propriety of the
cost defense thus depends on whether group traits may be used to justify adverse
treatment of individual employees.
The viability of the cost factor defense may well vary with the standard of
liability the court chooses. Under the Kouba reasonableness test, the cost factor
is likely to be viewed as "acceptable," 264 at least if the employer actually relied
on the differing costs in setting pay rates. The chief difficulty an employer is
likely to encounter under the Kouba standard is proving that it used the cost
factor reasonably. This prong of the Kouba test should be construed to require
an employer to show that the disparity in part-time workers' pay at least approx-
imates the additional costs incurred in employing part-time workers. The mere
fact that part-time workers cost more to employ should not justify a pay dispar-
ity unless there is an actual relationship between the amount of the disparity and
the amount of the additional cost.265 Moreover, the employer's proof may be
deficient if aggregate cost factors are not considered in setting pay rates of other
segregable groups of employees, particularly groups that are predominantly
male.266 If the Kouba reasonableness test is applied as stringently as advocated
above, it is unlikely that it will provide a sturdy shelter for disparate treatment
of part-time workers based on increased employment costs. The data suggest
that employers' fears about the costliness of part-time workers have been exag-
gerated.2 67 If employers are required to do much more than express a good faith
belief that part-time workers are more expensive to employ, there is a good pos-
sibility that existing pay disparities cannot be justified.
The cost factor defense has an even slimmer chance of success under the
two more employee-oriented objective standards than under the Kouba test.
Higher aggregate costs are not typically used in job evaluation plans as a factor
in setting wage rates268 and thus are not shielded by the Congressional respect
tial tied to the "ascertainable and specific added cost resulting from the employment of the opposite
sex" had been defeated. Id. at 717 n.32. Although the legislative history is unclear on this point, the
Court doubted that even a limited cost defense based on the total cost of employing men and women
would be permitted. Id.
264. Because the Kouba court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the EPA's fourth affirmative
defense should be limited to factors that predict individual job performance, see supra note 220, it is
likely that that court would take a fairly broad view in determining the acceptability of employer
justifications for pay disparities.
265. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.143 (1985) (employer may have to show "a reasonable relationship
between the amount of the differential and the weight properly attributable to the factor other than
sex").
266. The use of aggregate profit figures to justify pay disparities between male and female em-
ployees has met with only limited success. One court has permitted an employer to pay its salesmen
in a more profitable men's department a higher base salary than saleswomen in the women's depart-
ment. Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973). But see Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1031 (6th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing
Robert Hall in a case in which lower paid females earned more profit than males and sold exactly the
same product), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). For criticism of Robert Hall, see 1 A. LARSON &
L. LARSON, supra note 163, § 31.25, at 7-72 to -80.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
268. Job evaluation plans typically center around the four factors used to evaluate job similarity
under the EPA: skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. These four factors are broken
down into subcategories, including education, experience, complexity of duties, and mental and/or
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for job evaluation principles. Moreover, the cost defense fares no better under a
Title VII disparate impact analysis. The courts in Title VII cases have generally
looked suspiciously upon employer justifications of disparate impact that are not
premised on the job-related qualities of individual employees.269 Additionally,
courts deciding cases under Title VII frequently require more than a showing
that higher costs will be incurred if discrimination ceases. To justify adverse
impact of an employment practice on a group, an employer typically must show
that the challenged practice is a business necessity.270 Business necessity in this
context probably amounts to proof that the employer will go out of business or
otherwise suffer severe economic loss if forced to eliminate the disparate im-
pact.27 1 This showing would be a particularly difficult one for an employer at-
tempting to justify a pay disparity for part-time workers. Raising the part-time
rate to the full-time rate is unlikely to be ruinous for an employer, particularly
one who has discretion to slow down the rate of pay increases for full-time em-
ployees to offset the cost of pay equalization. 272
Finally, the defense that a pay disparity is justified because part-time work-
ers perform their jobs less competently than full-time workers is unlikely to suc-
ceed in many cases. Because this defense is grounded on specific job-related
qualities of the part-time work force, it would seem to qualify as an acceptable
defense under any of the three objective standards of liability. Certainly, when
an employer proves that an individual part-time worker is less productive or less
qualified than a full-time counterpart, the EPA permits a pay disparity. Claims
of lower performance levels for part-time workers as a group, however, are not
as persuasive in justifying pay differentials. An employer's contention that part-
visual demands. See D. TREIMAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW 6-7 (1979) (interim
report to EEOC). Unlike higher aggregate costs, these factors relate directly to an employee's job
performance. For a discussion of the job evaluation process, see Bellace, Comparable Worth: Prov-
ing Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, 69 IOWA L. REV. 655, 672-79 (1984).
269. See supra note 258.
270. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court defined business neces-
sity as an employment practice that is "shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance."
Id. at 332 n. 14. The Dothard standard for formulation of business necessity closely resembles the
formulation of that defense first enunciated in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.) (practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of business), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971). Some lower courts have refused to apply Dothard's stringent formulation. See, eg.,
Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1982); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d 1251, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 162, at 1328-30 (discussing contours of business necessity
defense).
271. Even proof of considerable economic loss does not justify explicit disparate treatment under
Title VII. See, eg., Fernandez v. Winn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (reluctance
of defendant's Latin American and Asian customers to transact business with a woman was no
defense to disparate treatment claim); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.)
(that marginal profits could be made by acceding to customer preference for female flight attendants
was no defense), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292,
294-95, 303-04 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (defense that continued profits depended upon maintaining air-
line's "LOVE" image with young, pretty stewardesses ruled invalid).
272. The EPA, however, expressly forbids an employer to "reduce the wage rate of an em-
ployee" to achieve compliance. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); see also 29 C.F.R. § 800.102 (1985) (wage
rate differential paid in violation of EPA cannot be corrected by reducing wage rate of any em-
ployee); cf. Ende v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 757 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirmative
action raises given only to female employees were lawful).
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time status is a predictor of relatively poor job performance is more likely to
justify a refusal to create part-time positions in particular job categories than to
explain a pay disparity between two groups of workers. It is very difficult for an
employer to present persuasive evidence that its part-time work force is less
competent than its full-time work force and to tie the part-time workers' lower
performance level to the precise difference in pay. These types of performance
evaluations are typically made on an individual, not a group, level.2 7 3 If an
employer is required to justify not only the existence but also the levels of ex-
isting pay disparities, the employer's burden of proof will be especially difficult
to meet. Because available data suggest that there is generally no difference in
quality between part-time and full-time workers,274 an employer will only rarely
be able to demonstrate that such a quality difference exists in its workplace and
to explain a pay disparity on the basis of quality alone.
In summary, none of the objective approaches to EPA liability is likely to
provide much insulation for an employer relying on part-time status to justify a
pay disparity. The crucial choice in EPA cases, therefore, is the choice between
an intent or a non-intent-based standard of liability. Given the predominantly
female character of the part-time work force, 275 courts adopting an objective
approach will be inclined to require proof that adverse treatment of part-time
workers is independently justified and not simply rooted in an untested belief
that part-time workers are less valuable workers. Unless courts become more
inclined to accept a market defense in EPA litigation, part-time workers should
be able to present formidable EPA claims.
Limiting employers' defenses in EPA cases is especially warranted in view
of the narrow class of cases that the EPA governs. To escape liability, an em-
ployer may always demonstrate a difference in the jobs performed by the two
groups of employees. 276 Thus, if part-time workers' jobs involve less responsibil-
ity or make fewer physical or mental demands than jobs performed by full-time
workers, a part-time worker will not be able to establish a prima facie case under
the EPA. When the jobs of both groups are equal, only demonstrable differences
in the quality of a part-time worker's ability or performance should justify a pay
disparity.
C. Title VII-Existing Doctrine
Even if the EPA were interpreted to outlaw payment of lower wages to
part-time employees who perform work substantially equal to that of full-time
273. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.143 (1985). The interpretation permits commissions based on individ-
ual earnings, but outlaws a higher "draw" for all male employees based on an employer's past expe-
rience that men generally earn more in commissions than women. Id.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
275. Some conceptual difficulty may arise when both the part- and full-time work forces are
predominantly female. For example, if the part-time work force in a particular job category is 95%
female and the corresponding full-time force is 80% female, it may be difficult to conclude that a
lower part-time rate of pay is a result of sex discrimination. In such cases, courts may be inclined to
require other indicia of discriminatory motive. Cf. supra note 240 (an objective standard of liability
is less compelling when the average wage for females is no lower than the average wage for males).
276. See supra text accompanying note 176.
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workers, the relatively poor position of the part-time worker in the American
workplace might not change appreciably.27 7 EPA protection alone is insuffi-
cient because most women who work part-time will be unable to identify any
higher paid full-time male workers doing the same work.278 For the large
number of part-time workers who are not protected by the EPA, the twin obsta-
cles to achieving parity with full-time workers are the lack of access to high
paying part-time work and the undervaluation of existing part-time
employment.
1. Case Law on Access
The current interpretation of Title VII holds out little promise of remedy-
ing the problems created by the lack of high paying part-time work. No existing
theory of discrimination requires employers to create attractive part-time work
for women or other employees. As long as an employer parcels out existing jobs
in a nondiscriminatory fashion, Title VII does not impose an affirmative duty to
structure job opportunities in a way that meets the needs and desires of female
applicants.27 9
The only access right peculiar to part-time workers under Title VII is their
right to be considered for full-time work, regardless of sex. Employers have
been held liable for locking women into part-time jobs and wrongfully denying
their requests for full-time work.280 This kind of purposeful sex discrimination
affects only women who work part-time involuntarily. For the voluntary part-
time worker seeking an upgraded part-time job, Title VII has not yet proven
useful.
2. Voluntary Part-Time Workers and Comparable Worth
Title VII does, however, possess the potential to benefit voluntary part-time
workers if the concept of comparable worth281 is used to remedy the problem of
undervaluation of existing part-time jobs. The gravamen of part-time workers'
Title VII comparable worth complaints would be that their pay has been de-
pressed, in part at least, because the part-time work force is predominantly
female.
To prove such a pay inequity claim, part-time workers could compare their
jobs to jobs held by predominantly full-time male workers. If the jobs were
277. Probably the greatest impact of such an interpretation of the EPA would be to force em-
ployers to offer pro rata fringe benefits to the part-time work force. Such a reform, however, might
also depend on the construction given to the term "wages" under the EPA. See supra note 172
(discussing the status of fringe benefits under the EPA and Title VII).
278. In some cases, both the full- and part-time work forces in a particular job category are
predominantly female. See supra note 275.
279. It might be possible, however, to construe Executive Order 11,246 to require the creation of
part-time work opportunities as an affirmative action obligation of government contractors. See
Exec. Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 28-31 (1982).
280. See Taylor v. Charley Bros., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602, 613 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Herrington v. Abington School Dist., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,098, at 11,519 (E.D. Pa.
1979), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1980).
281. For a definition of comparable worth, see supra note 4.
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sufficiently similar or comparable in required skills and function, the part-time
workers would have a basis for contending that their lower wages resulted from
the predominantly female character of their working group.2 82 Another possi-
ble method of invoking comparable worth analysis on behalf of part-time work-
ers would be to compare the rates of pay of part-time workers (if the group were
predominantly female) to the rates for full-time workers in the defendant's em-
ploy. Using statistical analysis, the rates could be analyzed to control for job-
related factors relevant to setting salaries (for example, knowledge, skill, respon-
sibility, and working conditions), excluding sex-linked factors, particularly the
factors of part-time status and job category.283 If a disparity persisted even in
the controlled rates, part-time workers would have a basis for claiming that sex,
as reflected in the predominant sexual character of the part-time working group,
was the true basis for the pay disparity.
There are not yet any cases invoking comparable worth theory on behalf of
a plaintiff class composed exclusively of part-time workers. It is reasonable to
assume, however, that in such cases courts would apply a doctrinal framework
identical to or similar to that applied in comparable worth cases brought by full-
time workers. Thus, the success of part-time workers asserting comparable
worth claims is likely to depend on the success of comparable worth claimants
generally. At this point, the trend is running against Title VII comparable
worth claimants.284 The gains that have been made in the area of comparable
worth are largely attributable to specific state legislative initiatives rather than to
Title VII.285
282. When only similar jobs that contain many of the same tasks are compared, the methodol-
ogy is sometimes referred to as the comparable work concept. See, eg., BUREAU OF NAT'L AF-
FAIRS, PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH 18 (1984) ("The comparable work concept involves
a claim that different jobs held by men and women are similar enough in their function and in their
skills required to justify equal wages.").
283. When dissimilar jobs that have few or no common tasks are compared on the basis of
measures of job worth (e.g., knowledge, skill, and mental and physical demands), the technique is
known as comparable worth. Id.; cf. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum
Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1299, 1320-23 (1984) (using regression analysis to discover which jobs the employer itself regards as
similar).
284. See, eg., American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 511 (1984).
During the Reagan administration, both the EEOC and the United States Commission on Civil
Rights have rejected a concept of comparable worth defined as an individual's claim of "increased
compensation on the basis of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of [the employee's] job with that of
other jobs in the same organization or community." Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at F-I, F-2
(June 18, 1985) (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981)). The EEOC
took the position that only claims of intentional wage discrimination are cognizable under Title VII
and found "no statutory basis or case law support for the conclusion that evidence consisting solely
of such a comparison is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII." Id. The Civil Rights Com-
mission issued a report concluding that "implementation of the unsound and misplaced concept of
comparable worth would be a serious error." Id. 71:A-3 (Apr. 12, 1985). The Government Ac-
counting Office, however, recently issued a report criticizing the Civil Rights Commission's report.
Id. 117:A-12-13 (June 24, 1985).
285. According to a Bureau of National Affairs report, 14 states have comparable worth laws
that cover both private and public employers. Nine of these states require equality in pay when
women perform "comparable work." The other five states prohibit an employer from paying une-
qual wages to women who perform work of a "comparable character." In addition, several states
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3. The Ambiguity of Gunther
The only directly relevant Supreme Court decision, County of Washington
v. Gunther,286 is frequently cited by both proponents 287 and opponents 288 of
comparable worth. Gunther involved a claim of pay disparity by an all-female
class of prison guards who were paid less than male guards.2 89 The plaintiffs'
case was quite strong. Although the job tasks performed by the two groups of
guards were not substantially equal, they were intuitively similar.290 Most im-
portantly, the county had conducted its own job evaluation and had paid the
female guards less than their evaluated worth, while paying the male guards
their full evaluated worth.291 The holding of Gunther was very narrow-the
Court decided only that the Bennett Amendment incorporates the four affirma-
tive defenses of the EPA into Title VII claims of sex-based wage discrimination
but does not impose the EPA's equal work requirement in such cases. 292 The
Court carefully refrained from holding that the highly probative evidence offered
by the plaintiffs was sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title VII.293
Proponents of comparable worth read Gunther as support for a comparable
worth theory in some form under Title VII.294 Gunther's recognition that sex-
based wage discrimination occurs outside the narrow prohibitions of the EPA
unleashed a host of plausible approaches to reducing the wage gap between men
and women that is so strongly associated with occupational segregation. Oppo-
nents of comparable worth focus on the narrowness of the Gunther holding and
the Court's dicta speculating on the possibility that the incorporation of the
EPA's fourth affirmative defense may limit employers' liability under Title
have created special commissions or committees to study and/or implement comparable worth in
the public sector only. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 282, at 55-56 (1984); A. COOK,
COMPARABLE WORTH: THE PROBLEM AND STATES' APPROACHES TO WAGE EQUITY (1983).
286. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
287. See, eg., Barnett, Comparable Worth and the Equal Pay Act-Proving Sex-Based Wage
Discrimination Claims After County of Washington v. Gunther, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1669 (1982);
Bellace, supra note 268; Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo. L.J. 1123
(1981); Levit & Mahoney, The Future of Comparable Worth Theory, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 99 (1984);
Vieira, Comparable Worth and the Gunther Case: The New Drive for Equal Pay, 18 U.C.D. L. REV.
449 (1985); Note, Comparable Worth: The Next Step Toward Pay Equity Under Title VII, 62 DEN.
L.J. 417 (1985).
288. See, eg., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at F-I, F-2 (June 18, 1985) (EEOC position);
Cox, Equal Work Comparable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argument for Narrowly Con-
struing County of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 109-12 (1983); O'Neill, An Argu-
ment Against Comparable Worth, in 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH:
ISSUE FOR THE 80's 177 (1985); Rabkin, Comparable Worth as Civil Rights Policy: Potential for
Disaster, in 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 187
(1985); Williams, Comparable Worth: Legal Perspectives and Precedents, in I U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 148 (1985).
289. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 164 n.1.
290. The primary function of both groups of guards was to supervise prisoners, although tile
male guards supervised more prisoners than the female guards, who did more clerical work. Id. at
164-65.
291. According to the county's evaluation, plaintiff's should have been paid approximately 95%
as much as male correctional officers, but they were paid only 70% as much. Id. at 180-81.
292. Id. at 171.
293. Id. at 166 n.8.
294. See supra authorities cited note 287.
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Vli.295
Put simply, proponents of comparable worth are inclined to read Gunther
as permitting both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims of sex-based
wage discrimination, subject only to the respect for bona fide job evaluation
plans that the Court articulated in dicta. In contrast, opponents of comparable
worth are apt to construe Gunther as requiring plaintiffs to prove intentional
disparate treatment. Read so narrowly, Gunther may encourage claims by only
a narrow class of plaintiffs who secure probative evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, preferably by reliance on an employer's own job evaluation.
4. Analysis of Lower Court Comparable Worth Cases
Given the ambiguity of Gunther, it is not surprising that the lower courts
have not agreed on the contours of Title VII claims of sex-based wage discrimi-
nation. To date, plaintiffs in Title VII sex-based wage discrimination suits have
encountered three related doctrinal obstacles that generally defeat their compa-
rable worth claims. First, some courts require direct evidence of intentional dis-
crimination to state a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 296  This
requirement makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prevail unless their
employers deviate from their own job evaluations. Second, some courts allow
employers to rely on a market-based rate in setting wages. 2 9 7 Thus, even if a
plaintiff can show a deviation from the employer's own job evaluation, the em-
ployer nevertheless may prevail by proving that its deviation reflected or was
compelled by the market rate. Last, some courts do not permit disparate impact
challenges to employers' overall pay structures.2 98 These courts take the posi-
tion that such structural policies are not susceptible to disparate impact analysis,
which should be used only to challenge operational policies, such as hiring crite-
ria and other employee selection devices. Under this view, the comparable
worth claimant is limited to proving discriminatory intent and consequently
may encounter the first two obstacles discussed above.
With respect to the plaintiff's prima facie burden, a major stumbling block
is not only the limitation of relief to claims of intentional discrimination but also
some courts' insistence that intent be proven by direct evidence in the plaintiff's
prima facie case.29 9 As in Gunther, such direct evidence most often consists of
job evaluations done by defendants. 3°° Absent such evidence from the horse's
295. See supra authorities cited note 288.
296. See, e.g., Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1983); Power v. Barry
County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
297. See, eg., Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Briggs v. City of Madison,
536 F. Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
298. See Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 705-08 (9th Cir. 1984). The Spaulding
court distinguished Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3544 (1984), which had allowed a disparate impact challenge to a specific employer policy (a
head-of-household premium) "rather than a full-scale assault on the employer's salary practices."
Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708; see also American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Wash-
ington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v.
County of Nassau, 609 F. Supp. 695, 712 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (following Spaulding analysis).
299. See Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir. 1983).
300. There is also a question whether an employer must actually adopt a job evaluation study in
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mouth, some courts are inclined to rule for defendants in order to avoid making
the "essentially subjective assessment" 30 1 of the value of differing jobs.
A refusal to allow plaintiffs to rely on their own experts to establish the
comparability of different jobs has been regarded by some as consistent with
Gunther's limited holding that arguably permits only claims of intentional dis-
crimination. 302 However, there is no logical reason that a prima facie case of
intent must be limited to proof by direct evidence secured from a defendant's
own job evaluation. In other Title VII contexts, a prima facie showing of ad-
verse impact, without direct evidence of discriminatory intent, is sufficient to
create a rebuttable inference of intentional discrimination. 30 3 Thus, the require-
ment that plaintiffs ultimately prove a case of intentional discrimination does not
dictate the necessary elements of a prima facie case.3°4 Recognizing this distinc-
tion, one district court allowed a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination by adducing independent expert proof of job compa-
rability.30 5 Another district court found intentional wage discrimination when
an employer segregated women into one department and failed to conduct a job
evaluation to assess the relative value of men's and women's jobs.306
The courts' reluctance to assess the comparability of different jobs is not
always indicative of skepticism concerning the merits of job evaluation as a tech-
nique. Indeed, in EPA cases, courts have been required to compare jobs that
employers claimed were different.307 In determining whether jobs are substan-
tially equal under the EPA, courts have become quite comfortable in relying on
order for deviation from the study to create an inference of discrimination. See American Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees v. County of Nassau, 609 F. Supp. 695, 710 (E.D.N.Y.1985)
(discriminatory intent may be proven even if employer did not adopt job evaluation).
301. Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Spaulding v. Uni-
versity of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to infer discriminatory intent from
existence of wage differences between jobs that were only similar and rejecting comparability plus
test); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.) (refusal to assess the worth
of nurses' jobs as compared with other jobs in the community), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300, 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (undervaluation of
predominantly female clerical jobs does not support claim of intentional discrimination).
302. See Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982) ("Supreme Court's
recognition of intentional discrimination may well signal the outer limit of the legal theories cogniza-
ble under Title VII.").
303. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); cf B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, supra note 162, at 497-99 (discussing adaptation of McDonnell Douglas elements in Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act cases).
304. See Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 701-04 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining
evidence relevant to intent, including defendant's attitude toward and treatment of female faculty
members); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. County of Nassau, 609 F. Supp.
695, 710-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (not necessary to show that defendant disregarded its own job
evaluation).
305. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982); see also Beall v.
Curtis, 603 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (M.D. Ga.) (following Briggs criteria for establishing a prima facie
case), aff'd, 778 F.2d 791 (1Ith Cir. 1985); cf Campbell, supra note 283, at 1321-23 (using regression
analysis to discover employer's own job evaluation standards).
306. Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
307. See, eg., Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1976) (com-
paring wage disparities among hospital aides, orderlies, maids, and janitors); Schultz v. American
Can Co.-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970) (comparing wage disparities between male
and female machine operators); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.) (comparing
wage disparities between male and female selector-packers), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
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experts in the field of job evaluation. The courts' reluctance to extend this reli-
ance to Title VII cases may reflect the realization that comparable worth cases
are often more complex and far-reaching than EPA claims.308 Their reluctance
probably also stems from unwillingness to face the difficult questions posed by
the incorporation of the EPA's fourth affirmative defense into Title VII cases, in
particular, the role that should be accorded the market defense.
The ultimate success of comparable worth claims is likely to depend more
on the role given to the market defense than on the required elements of a plain-
tiff's prima facie case. In cases in which plaintiffs rely on a deviation from the
employer's own job evaluation, the employer is likely to justify the deviation as a
result of market forces. 30 9 In cases in which the employer has conducted no job
evaluation, the challenged salary scale is often set to reflect market wages for
particular jobs.310 Thus, it appears that the critical issue in both types of cases is
the extent to which Title VII allows employers to rely on or adopt the market
rate, despite any depressing effect such reliance has on the wages of employees in
predominantly female jobs.
The much-heralded decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
v. Washington (AFSCME)3 11 recently focused attention on the market defense.
The court refused to draw an inference of discriminatory intent from the State's
adherence to market rates, despite job evaluation evidence indicating that the
market undervalued predominantly female jobs. 312 The State had employed a
308. One obvious complexity associated with comparable worth claims is fashioning an appro-
priate remedy. The only allowable remedy for an EPA violation is the equalization of pay rates of
male and female employees to the higher male rate. See supra note 272. In a comparable worth
case, however, the percentage pay increase that the plaintiffs should receive may be hotly contested,
and it will often be necessary to resort to a technique such as job evaluation to determine the appro-
priate size of the increase.
309. For example, in Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982), the
city's job survey classified the job of public health nurse at or above the level of sanitarian, but nurses
were paid less than sanitarians. The city justified the pay disparity by claiming that the wage rate for
sanitarians had to be increased in order for the city to compete in the market for qualified job
applicants. The court accepted this modified market defense, relying on the pre-Gunther decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th
Cir. 1977). The court in Christensen had found no Title VII violation when defendant undertook a
job evaluation study, adopted the recommended wage scales, and then modified the plan to provide
higher salaries to physical plant workers in order to meet the prevailing wage rates in the community
for jobs of the same type.
310. See, eg., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980). A distinction should be made between benchmark jobs and unique jobs. Bench-
mark jobs are generally entry level jobs in which wages depend greatly upon outside market forces.
Employers thus often pay the going market rate in benchmark jobs. Unique jobs are generally
higher ranking than benchmark jobs and are filled through promotions from benchmark jobs. The
wages paid for unique jobs are usually determined by the employer. If the employer uses a job
evaluation study, the wages paid for benchmark jobs serve as the criteria for the job evaluation
system, and the system is then used to establish wages for the unique jobs. Finally, there are some
jobs in which employees are strongly committed to their occupation (eg., lawyers), and employers
generally look to the market in setting wages for the occupation. See 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80'S 51 (1984) (statement of Dr. Schwab).
311. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). The AFSCME litigation was ultimately settled. The state
agreed to spend $46.5 million by 1987 and $10 million per year until 1992 to correct inequities in the
State's compensation system. Labor Law Reports (CCH) Report 265, at 1 (Jan. 23, 1986).
312. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407.
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consultant to undertake a comprehensive comparable worth study of State gov-
ernment salaries. The study concluded that employees in predominantly female
jobs were paid approximately twenty percent less than employees in predomi-
nantly male jobs, even though they performed jobs of comparable worth to the
State. 313
If the court's treatment of the market force defense in AFSCME is widely
accepted, it could severely limit pay equity claims. The court apparently re-
garded the employer's adherence to the market rate as per se reasonable and did
not require the employer to defend its decision to follow the market rate in the
context of the particular case. Technically, the plaintiffs in AFSCME lost be-
cause they failed to establish a prima facie case, not because the State success-
fully proved an affirmative defense of reasonable market reliance. In contrast to
EPA litigation in which the employer has the burden of proving the nonsexist
character of wage disparity, 314 the plaintiffs in AFSCME were assigned the bur-
den of coming forward with evidence, other than evidence ofjob worth, to prove
that the market-based system was maintained for a discriminatory purpose.3 15
Such evidence of discriminatory motive in the setting of salaries is often very
difficult to amass. 3 16
The debate over the market rate defense in Title VII cases is closely akin to
the debate over the scope of the fourth affirmative defense in the EPA cases.
The key difference in the Title VII jurisprudence is the absence of a leading
plaintiff-oriented case like Corning Glass. There is no Supreme Court statement
in the Title VII case law comparable to the statement in Corning Glass question-
ing the legality of reliance on market factors. The Court in Corning Glass was
willing to read the legislative history of the EPA as endorsing a theory of dis-
crimination designed in part to correct the effects of a discriminatory market.3 17
Under the Corning Glass approach, employers were not allowed to profit from
an inequitable market-based scheme that pays women less than men for equal
work.
In contrast to Corning Glass, the Title VII cases in the lowver courts gener-
ally regard the market as a neutral force and allow employers to act in accord-
ance with economic realities and the laws of supply and demand, even if such
action results in lower wages for predominantly female jobs.3 18 Under this view,
313. Id. at 1403.
314. See Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196-97.
315. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407-08. Because the AFSCME court concluded that plaintiffs had
not established a prima facie case, it did not address the question whether defendant bore a burden of
persuasion or merely a burden of producing evidence. Compare Kouba, 691 F.2d at 875 (employer
bears the burden of persuasion to establish the "factor other than sex" defense in Title VII wage
litigation) with Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 448 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation).
316. For example, the AFSCME court did not regard defendant's prior use of sex segregated
want ads as sufficient to create an inference of discrimination in the setting of salaries. AFSCME,
770 F.2d at 1408.
317. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 195.
318. See, eg., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Briggs v. City of
Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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an employer that relies on the market is not culpable because the market, not the
employer, is seen to create the economic inequity, regardless of whether the em-
ployer is of sufficient size to influence the market rate.3 19 The employer's deci-
sion to compensate female jobs at a rate lower than their evaluated worth is not
viewed as a voluntary decision that unfairly takes advantage of an inequitable
market. The principal difference between these Title VII market rate defense
cases and Gunther seems to be the difference between lawfully raising men's pay
to equal the market rate and unlawfully depressing women's pay below the mar-
ket rate. The latter practice smacks of active, intentional discrimination; the
former can be characterized as passive, nondiscriminatory adherence to market
forces.
The final obstacle to using Title VII as a tool to reduce wage disparities in
traditionally female jobs is some courts' hesitation to permit the use of disparate
impact analysis to challenge an employer's overall wage structure.320 The best
example of the use of disparate impact analysis in a wage controversy is the
opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton in the AFSCME litigation.32 1 The district court relied on the State-commis-
sioned comparable worth study to find that the State's compensation system had
a disparate impact on predominantly female job classifications.322 The court
concluded that the State should be held liable because it had not proved a legiti-
mate, overriding business justification for the disparity.323
The district court's straightforward use of disparate impact analysis in
AFSCME was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.3 24 The court of appeals adopted the favored, more conservative ap-
proach holding that an employer's compensation system does not constitute a
policy susceptible to a disparate impact challenge. 325 This conservative ap-
proach restricts disparate impact challenges to specific employer practices that
are not related to market prices, such as hiring tests and other discrete selection
procedures. 326 In tune with the readiness of some courts to view market forces
319. For example, the plaintiff class in AFSCME consisted of approximately 15,500 State em-
ployees who worked in predominantly female jobs. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1403. Despite the rela-
tive importance of the State as an employer, the court viewed the State's decision to rely on market
rates as constrained by market forces beyond the State's control. Id. at 1407.
320. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
321. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
322. Id. at 861.
323. Id. at 863.
324. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405-06 (employer's decision to rely on market-based compensation
system is "too multifaceted" for disparate impact analysis).
325. Id. at 1407-08; see Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir. 1984).
326. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985) (broad
scale attacks against a wide range of policies are inappropriate under disparate impact approach);
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact model is not an
appropriate means to launch a wide-ranging attack on employment practices); Heagney v. Univer-
sity of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (classification of certain employees as "exempt"
and not subject to salary adjustments under State personnel law was not a well-defined, objective
employment practice subject to disparate impact analysis). But see Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516,
1522-25 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (disparate impact analysis is proper means to challenge final result of over-
all promotion process). See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINA-
TION § 1.23, at 24 (Supp. 1985) (analysis of cases treating scope of disparate impact theory).
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as a defense, there is a simultaneous refusal to view reliance on the market price
for labor as prima facie discriminatory. This "respect" for the market may lead
courts to view employers as mere market players that cannot be held responsible
for the rules of the game:
Every employer constrained by market forces must consider mar-
ket values in setting his labor costs. Naturally, market prices are in-
herently job-related, although the market may embody social
judgments as to the worth of some jobs. Employers relying on the
market are, to that extent, "price-takers." They deal with the market
as a given, and do not meaningfully have a "policy" about it in the
relevant Title VII sense.327
This attitude conflicts fundamentally with the theory underlying disparate
impact analysis. The theory requires employers to bear some of the costs of
societal discrimination by dismantling unnecessary barriers to equal employ-
ment opportunity. 328 Even the use of well-established, facially reasonable poli-
cies must be justified if the policies are subject to a disparate impact challenge.
Refusing to classify an employer's market reliance as a policy susceptible to a
disparate impact challenge only evades the more important question whether
market reliance is justified in the circumstances of individual cases.
In sum, most comparable worth cases have accepted the principle of com-
parable pay for work of comparable value only in those instances in which an
employer's pay structure may be characterized as intentionally designed to dis-
criminate against women. No consensus, however, has emerged as to the spe-
cific elements of such a claim of intentional discrimination. Whether
comparable worth theory will ultimately improve the lot of part-time Workers
thus depends on the particulars of such a refined disparate treatment framework
for adjudicating claims of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII.
D. Fitting Comparable Worth to Part-Time Work
Perhaps more than any other group of predominantly female employees,
part-time workers need judicial acceptance of comparable worth theory to up-
327. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir. 1984).
328. See Chamallas, supra note 197, at 365-70. The courts' resistance to disparate impact theory
in wage cases may have influenced the outcome of some class actions based primarily on a disparate
treatment theory. In attacking an employer's wage structure as discriminatory under a disparate
treatment theory, a plaintiff must prove more than a gross wage disparity between male and female
employees. The parties typically use sophisticated statistical techniques to control for neutral factors
that influence the employer's pay scheme. If a disparity remains unexplained, an inference of dis-
crimination may be drawn. In many cases, there is a preliminary debate as to whether certain sex-
linked variables can be used to explain pay disparities or should be excluded from the explanatory
model to avoid perpetuation of past disparate treatment. Such variables may include job rank, prior
salary, and even job department or job category, because such factors are likely to reflect patterns of
discrimination against women. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 326, § 1.14, at 23 (1980),
Some courts' requirement that a plaintiff's regression model include such sex-linked factors is consis-
tent with the overall reluctance to embrace comparable worth theory as a tool to lessen pay dispari-
ties produced by occupation segregation. See Sobel v. Yeshiva, 566 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
But cf EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank, 497 F. Supp. 733, 755 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (To defeat a claim of
discrimination in promotion, defendant bank could not include part-time status in regression analy-
sis because of inherent sexual bias.).
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grade their status. Part-time workers tend to be doubly disadvantaged; they are
crowded into predominantly female jobs and their part-time status is then used
to justify unfavorable treatment.
One of the aims of comparable worth theory is to expose the degree to
which pay scales in predominantly female jobs reflect the sex of the job holders,
rather than more objective, non-sex-based factors such as job worth. For the
reasons discussed in Parts I and II of this Article, part-time job status, like par-
ticular job categories, should be recognized as a classification that potentially
masks sex discrimination. In essence, the female part-time worker's complaint is
that her disproportionately low wages result in part from the predominantly
female character of her working group. The part-time worker contends that, if
the part-time work force were truly sexually integrated, pay rates for the group
would be raised. Under this view, individual employers may be held responsible
for sex-based discrimination against part-time workers insofar as they use part-
time status as a device to depress the wages of women.
1. The Part-Time Worker's Double Burden
Of the many analytic frameworks proposed for Title VII comparable worth
litigation, the approach advocated by Winn Newman and Jeanne Vonhof 32 9 has
special relevance for the part-time work force. Newman and Vonhof argue that
plaintiffs in predominantly female jobs should be allowed to raise an inference of
intentional sex discrimination in wages by showing a pattern of employer-con-
trolled job segregation coupled with disproportionately low wages. 330 In their
view, an employer that is guilty of discriminatory assignment by intentionally
excluding women or channeling women away from desirable jobs is also likely to
devalue the segregated work that women do.331 As an administrative matter,
such job segregation facilitates wage discrimination. 332 It is less risky for an
employer to pay lower wages to women by separating them into different job
categories with lower pay rates than to violate the EPA by paying men more for
performing equal work.
Newman and Vonhoff's analysis exposes the symbiotic relationship between
job segregation and wage discrimination at the single plant or single employer
level. Their analysis demonstrates how lack of access to higher paying jobs may
result in a double burden: the employee is denied the better job and simultane-
ously is shunted into a job that is paid at a rate even lower than its evaluated
worth.
Voluntary part-time workers are similarly burdened by lack of access to
desirable jobs and devalued wages in segregated jobs. Because employers have
severely limited the number of higher paying part-time positions, part-time
329. Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal"--Job Segregation and Pay Equity in the Wake
of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 269.
330. Id. at 287.
331. Id. at 271.
332. Id. at 300; cf. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1084-85 (1984) (school board's use of racial segregation facilitates dispa-
rate treatment of black children).
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workers are relegated to inferior jobs that are paid at a rate lower than their
evaluated worth. The key difference between the predicament of the female full-
time worker and that of the part-time worker lies in the different mechanisms
used to maintain job segregation by sex. In the full-time work force, employers
maintain segregation by discriminatory job assignments. In the part-time work
force, employers maintain segregation by limiting the types of jobs that can be
filled on a part-time basis. Although these practices have the same effect on
employees, the different discriminatory mechanisms carry significantly different
legal consequences. The full-time worker may sue under Title VII, alleging dis-
criminatory assignment. The proof problems in such a case are often severe, but
the full-time worker is at least assured a cause of action. The part-time worker,
however, has no cause of action under Title VII for the employer's failure to
create desirable part-time opportunities. The part-time worker must rely exclu-
sively on the controversial concept of comparable worth. As in many other ar-
eas of the law, the distinction between harmful action and harmful inaction
creates an anomalous patchwork of relief.
2. Reforming Title VII for Part-Time Workers
The twin problems of lack of access to desirable part-time jobs and devalua-
tion of existing part-time work may be addressed by refining the comparable
worth litigation framework to meet the special needs of part-time workers. Like
their full-time counterparts, part-time workers in predominantly female jobs
should be able to establish prima facie cases of wage discrimination by showing
that they perform work that is undervalued relative to the work done by full-
time male workers. At this point, the framework should be adjusted to fit the
part-time work setting. Employers should be permitted to rebut an inference of
discrimination by showing either that the plaintiff's assessment of job compara-
bility is flawed or that the employer has provided a significant number of part-
time jobs that are compensated at a relatively high rate.
The framework outlined above is a variant of the typical Title VII disparate
treatment analysis. Disparate treatment analysis seeks to discover whether an
underlying reason for adverse treatment is sex-based. 333 The elements of a
plaintiff's prima facie case constitute those factors that "if otherwise unex-
plained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors."' 334 Disparate treatment analysis generally requires plaintiffs to elimi-
nate the most likely neutral explanations for the employer's conduct. 335 If the
333. The Supreme Court has described the test in Title VII claims of sex-based disparate treat-
ment as a "but-for" inquiry: whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner which
"but for that person's sex would be different." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711. The Court used a similar
formulation in the leading constitutional sex discrimination case. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (test is whether defendant's action was taken "at least in part 'because of,'
and not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group").
334. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
335. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977), the
Supreme Court noted that the four elements of plaintiff's prima facie case eliminate the two most
common legitimate reasons for which an employer may reject a job applicant: lack of qualifications
and lack of a vacancy in the position sought.
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plaintiff states a prima facie case, the employer must rebut the inference of dis-
crimination by adducing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the plaintiff's unfavorable treatment. The plaintiff retains the burden of persua-
sion throughout the litigation and may counter the employer's rebuttal by prov-
ing pretext-that the employer's proffered reason was not the true reason for its
action.336 Although the issue is debatable, courts generally have not required
plaintiffs to show actual employer hostility toward either particular female
plaintiffs or toward women in general. 337 Instead, courts find sex-based discrim-
ination if the employer would not have treated the plaintiff unfavorably had the
plaintiff been a male.
The comparable worth proposal for part-time workers discussed above re-
sembles the typical disparate treatment case in that it requires plaintiffs to elimi-
nate one of the common explanations for disparity in pay rates, namely job
worth. Once it is established that a disparity in pay for part-time workers is not
justified or explained by factors accepted as part of established job evaluation
principles, a suspicion arises that the employer may be intentionally using the
workers' part-time status to depress the wages of women. The most convincing
evidence an employer can adduce to dispel this suspicion is a factual showing
that, at its workplace, part-time status is not strongly associated with low wages.
For example, a showing that the average wage for part-time workers is not sig-
nificantly lower than the average wage for full-time workers would be highly
probative evidence that the employer is not using part-time status to disadvan-
tage women. If opportunities to secure higher paying part-time positions exist,
the employer can show that its part-time work force is not caught in the double
bind of no access to desirable jobs followed by devalued wages for existing jobs.
If a voluntary part-time worker can escape the problem of undervaluation of her
existing employment by switching to a higher paying part-time job, her part-
time status should not be regarded as a significant barrier to higher pay. An
employer who fills a considerable number of high paying jobs with part-time
personnel also displays the kind of receptiveness to part-time work that makes it
unlikely that the employer used the part-time classification for discriminatory
purposes.
The proposal advanced in this Article departs from the traditional disparate
treatment analysis in that it permits an employer to adduce only two types of
evidence to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case: evidence of lack of job compara-
bility or evidence of equal access for part-time workers to high paying jobs.
336. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
337. See, ag., EEOC v. Brown & Root, 688 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1982); Phillips v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 598 F. Supp. 40, 44 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Shaw v. Boorstin, 517 F. Supp.
336, 338-39 (D.D.C. 1981); Oshiver v. Court of Common Pleas, 469 F. Supp. 645, 652 (E.D. Pa.
1979). But see Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 878 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (court found
plaintiff showed no "specific animus" toward women or toward plaintiff as a woman), aff'd, 766
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). For commentary on the meaning of the intent requirement in disparate
treatment cases, see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.4(b), at 18-22 (1980); Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent
Under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
1201 (1982); Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social
Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
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Other types of rebuttal evidence are not permitted. For example, that an em-
ployer has hired a significant number of women in high paying full-time posi-
tions or has otherwise engaged in affirmative action should not be considered in
determining whether a wage disparity between full-time and part-time workers
is sex-based. Nor may an employer rely on the market rate to prove that it has
not intentionally lowered the wage rate for part-time workers below the market
level.
These limitations on the disparate treatment model are needed because the
aim of a comparable worth suit in the part-time context is to arrive at a fair
assessment of part-time work, untainted by the predominant sex of the working
group. Under the proposal, an employer is required to treat this important
group of predominantly female workers with the same consideration that it ex-
tends to the majority of its workers. From this perspective, it is not enough that
an employer show due regard for full-time women workers. In the second gen-
eration of sexism, the law should protect against discriminatory mechanisms
that divide and conquer traditionally disadvantaged groups. It is discriminatory
to leave a significant minority of women workers unprotected while protecting
virtually all male workers.338 The difficulty of detecting discrimination against
part-time workers and the ability of some women workers to secure equal treat-
ment should not foreclose relief to part-time workers victimized by discrimina-
tion. Comparable worth theory goes beyond tokenism and tests the rationality
of seemingly neutral distinctions that are used to disadvantage discrete groups of
women. Thus, in applying comparable worth theory, it is proper to focus only
on the treatment of part-time workers as a distinct group of predominantly fe-
male workers. An employer's favorable treatment of full-time female workers
therefore is not sufficient to dispel an inference of discrimination.
It is also essential that employers be precluded from relying on the market
rate for part-time workers to rebut a plaintiff's claim of discriminatory treat-
ment. As many commentators have argued, 33 9 the market rate is not always
neutral. The legislative history of the EPA documents Congressional recogni-
tion that the market can and does discriminate against women. 340 In the part-
time context, the market rate reflects the fact that part-timers have been ex-
cluded from higher paying positions and segregated into lower paying jobs.
Comparable worth theory attempts to substitute a more gender-neutral assess-
ment ofjob worth than the market supplies. Although job evaluation techniques
are not always unbiased,3 41 they tend not to disadvantage women to the same
338. In other contexts courts have recognized that discrimination against a subgroup of a pro-
tected group is actionable. For a discussion of the rejection of the so-called "sex-plus" and "same
sex selection" defenses see Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9-17, 19-22.
339. See, ag., Newman & Vonhof, supra note 329, at 311-15; Vieira, supra note 287, at 473-76;
Note, supra note 287, at 437-42.
340. See S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
341. For commentary on the difficulty of formulating and applying unbiased standards of job
evaluation, see WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES, supra note 30, at 77-78; Law, supra note 128, at 1305-
10; Schwab, Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 49, 59-60
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degree as does market reliance.342
Comparable worth theory will lose much of its reform potential if employ-
ers may avoid liability by relying on a collective market assessment that incorpo-
rates the discriminatory judgments and actions of others. In Title VII suits
alleging discrimination in areas other than wage rates, employers have not been
permitted to use the sex-based preferences of others as the basis for their own
practices and policies.343 The proposal advanced in this Article embodies the
judgment that employers that perpetuate a system of depressed wages for part-
time workers by excluding part-time workers from high paying jobs in their es-
tablishments should not be afforded a market defense.
The principal inquiry in a comparable worth disparate treatment analysis is
whether the employer's market reliance is neutrally grounded or is used to ac-
complish a discriminatory objective. Because market reliance has been used for
discriminatory purposes, it makes sense to be somewhat skeptical when an em-
ployer claims that it is following the market only for the information the market
conveys concerning the relative utility of certain jobs. The proposal set forth
above strives to ascertain the reason for an employer's market reliance by exam-
ining the employer's overall treatment of part-time workers, both with respect to
pay and access to desirable jobs.
Allowing employers to rebut inferences of discrimination by showing that
they provide adequate access to high paying part-time jobs not only dispels
doubts about the neutrality of an employer's wage decisions, but also provides
an incentive for employers to create desirable part-time jobs. The comparable
worth movement has raised public consciousness about the devaluation of wo-
men's work. Traditional Title VII theory affords women legal access to full-time
work. The proposal advanced here confronts the unmet needs of the part-time
work force for pay equity and equal access.
The proposed framework for litigating Title VII part-time work cases does
not represent a serious departure from relevant precedent. The proposal uses a
variant of disparate treatment analysis rather than a pure disparate impact
(E. Livernash ed. 1980); Remarks of Professor Bartholet, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at D-1
(June 12, 1985).
342. Comparable worth studies conducted in several states indicate that substantial pay dispari-
ties exist between male and female employees performing comparable jobs. For example, studies in
the State of Washington since 1974 indicated a 20% salary disparity between predominantly male
and predominantly female jobs requiring an equivalent or lesser composite of skill, effort, responsi-
bility, and working conditions as reflected in the number of job evaluation points assigned. Ameri-
can Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846, 864 (W.D. Wash.
1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). A Wisconsin study revealed that clerical employees
were underpaid relative to comparable blue collar employees by approximately $2,300 to $2,500 a
year. A. COOK, supra note 285, at 80-81. A Minnesota study disclosed "substantial disparities"
between salaries of male and female State workers. Rothchild, Toward Comparable Worth: The
Minnesota Experience, 2 YALE L. & PoL'V REV. 346, 354-55 (1984); see also Note, The Minnesota
Comparable Worth Statute, 6 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. 21, 23 (1985) (discussing the Minnesota
study).
343. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Jatczak v. Ochburg, 28
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1773 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp.
292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See generally Chamallas, supra note 338, at 7-9 (discussing explicit sex-based
cases).
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model. Under pure disparate impact analysis, an employer would be required to
justify any structural policy having a disparate impact on women. Thus, an
employer would be required to show that a low wage rate for a predominantly
female job was a business necessity. In such disparate impact litigation, the sole
focus would be on job worth, as measured by job evaluation principles. 344 By
allowing the adequate access rebuttal, the disparate treatment proposal ad-
vanced here would focus litigation on an employer's purpose in creating and
maintaining a part-time classification, not directly and exclusively on job worth.
Under this proposal, job evaluation would be used to uncover purposeful dis-
crimination. This focus on purposeful discrimination accords with the restric-
tive Gunther dicta and the reluctance of most lower courts to embrace a full-
fledged disparate impact model for sex-based wage discrimination claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of part-time work to the economic sustenance of millions of
Americans compels the law's attention to ensuring equity for part-time workers.
This need is compounded by the predominantly female composition of the part-
time work force and by evidence that the sex-segregated character of that work
force has contributed to conditions of inequitably low pay and unjustifiably neg-
ative employer expectations. The relatively low prestige of part-time work, how-
ever, raises doubts about whether reform in this area will significantly improve
the economic status of working women. What is needed to allay this concern is
a legal strategy for part-time workers aimed at achieving both pay equity and
access to jobs that are economically rewarding and traditionally dominated by
men.
An important first step in achieving these goals is to redirect the interpreta-
tion of existing pay equity law in a way that is attuned to the problems of part-
time workers. If interpreted strictly, the Equal Pay Act is well-suited to re-
dressing claims of women part-time workers who are paid less than their full-
time male colleagues for equal work. Title VII may reach an even broader class
of part-time workers through a specially designed comparable worth approach.
The effective application of either statute, however, requires attention to the
kinds of defenses that employers will be allowed to assert in response to charges
of sex discrimination against part-time workers. Because of the strong consen-
sus behind the policy of the EPA, pay disparities between part-time and full-
time work should be eliminated, unless there is a showing that a challenged pay
disparity reflects objective differences in the types of jobs performed or in the
abilities or performances of the workers. Although a similar objective approach
under Title VII would be attractive, recent comparable worth decisions indicate
that courts are unlikely to adopt such a full-blown disparate impact theory. The
proposal advanced here thus attempts to protect part-time workers through dis-
parate treatment claims of intentionally depressed pay for predominantly female
344. See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846,
863-64 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rey'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
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part-time jobs. Under the proposal, employers may rebut claims of disparate
treatment only by showing unequal job worth or by showing that the part-time
employees in their work forces have equal access to high paying part-time jobs.
Pending more comprehensive legislative attempts in the future to provide full
economic equity to part-time workers, these doctrinal innovations should stimu-
late some advances in nondiscriminatory treatment and job access for part-time
workers.

